UPDATED, UPDATED: Bolivia’s President Carlos Mesa turned in his resignation to Congress this morning. (Link updated). Congress, which is led by opposition lawmakers, will vote on whether to accept it Tuesday in a special session. The gas-rich country’s been a tragic failed state for about a year and a half, but this could be a major turn for the worse, or else a bold bid by Pres. Mesa to rally support from the public. There is still uncertainty about what sort of government is to follow. There is considerable suspicion about the role of Venezuela in creating the crisis. Last week, Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and President Mesa, were in a figurative ‘shouting match,’ with Chavez denouncing some Bolivians as oligarchs intent on breaking up the state and then backing off on that implied threat. Don’t be so sure – we are likely to see his hand in this as news comes out.

UPDATED, UPDATED, UPDATED AGAIN: News remains sketchy but here is a Bolivian background news roundup from the past 17 months – this will be updated as possible:

October 2003 President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada resigns after huge protests and violence over the privatization of water, which poor and indigenous protestors said cost too much. The most violent protests are in El Alto. About 67 protestors die. Vice President Carlos Mesa, a soft-spoken academic and TV presenter, takes over the presidency.

July 2004 Bolivians overwhelmingly approve in a referendum increased state involvement in the gas industry and higher export royalties for multinationals. Bolivia has the second-largest natural gas reserves (after Venezuela) in South America.

January 2005 A general strike against Aguas de Illimani takes place in El Alto. Led by radical leftist Evo Morales of the coca-growers Socialist party, they block roads to force the government to lower water and utility prices at newly privatized companies. The government says it will comply.

Jan. 28, 2005 That in turn angers wealthier Santa Cruz residents who resent the interference in privatized business. They also resent an effort by populist leader Evo Morales (who only drew 19% of the vote in Congress) to enact a new land-confiscation law that targets Santa Cruz landholdings. They demand a referendum on autonomy for their region, and get it. 100,000 Santa Cruz state voters sign a petition that enables them to seek autonomy and elect their own governor. This becomes a serious crisis for Pres. Mesa’s presidency as he finds himself tugged at politically by two sides radically opposed to one another.

February 2005 U.S. Plan Colombia funding approved for Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru’s drug-fighting efforts. The $700m package for 2006 is about the same as last year, slightly less in some areas. Bolivia and Peru, between them, will get about $300m in the program for drug fighting efforts in the coming year, a State Department official tells me.

Feb. 3, 2005 Bolivia’s Pres. Mesa replaces eight cabinet ministers in a shakeup, and splits the mining and hydrocarbons ministry.

Feb. 13, 2005 Norman Bailey warns in the Washington Times about the implications of the growing movement against privatization in Bolivia.

Feb. 15, 2005 The Andean Community of Nations expresses interest in helping to resolve Bolivia’s internal problems. Pres. Mesa asks them to help him increase access to international markets.

Feb. 22, 2005 Bolivia’s former President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and much of his former cabinet is charged with genocide in connection with the deaths of protestors in unrest leading up to his resignation in October 2003.

Feb. 26, 2005 Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez meets with Evo Morales in Caracas the week earlier. A Venezuelan news source e-mails me: Morales said his social Indian groups back President Chavez against “imperial threats.” He also said that there is hope, with the realization of a new Constitutional Assembly, that unity among the Bolivians is possible and will take them forward. Chavez condemns “oligarchic” groups that he claims want to divide Bolivia so that the constitutional process doesn’t go ahead.

Feb. 28, 2005 Evo Morales appears on Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s weekly radio/television program. (Yes, Chavez also is a talk-show host.) Using more of the same divisive language he uses on his own opposition, Chavez publicly declares Bolivia’s Santa Cruz residents ‘oligarchic,’ and ‘U.S.-driven’ and intent on breaking up the country.

March 1, 2005 Bolivia and Chile, in Montevideo, Uruguay for President Tabare Vazquez’s inauguration, sign a visa agreement to enable their citizens to travel across the common border without visas or passports. The two states have been in a rift over a passage to the sea for Bolivia, for 126 years, so the accord is a sign of significantly improved relations.

March 1, 2005 Bolivia’s Foreign Relations Minister meets with his Venezuelan counterpart Ali Rodriguez in Montevideo Uruguay to let him know they are concerned about Chavez’s opinion that the Bolivian’s “oligarchy” is trying to stop a Constitutional Assembly, my news source in Caracas e-mails me.

March 2, 2005 Bolivia’s lower house of Congress gets ready to enact a new hydrocarbons law likely to chase out foreign investment in the country due to new high royalty requirements. FT reports that foreign investors are worried.

March 2, 2005 A major controversy in Bolivia erupts over Chavez’s public remarks. Bolivia issues a formal note of concern of its ‘discomfort’ to Venezuela’s government after President Hugo Chavez earlier called Bolivia’s planned Santa Cruz referendum ‘Washington-driven’ and ‘oligarchic.’

March 3, 2005 The US and Bolivia spar over whether US military personnel in Bolivia should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The US says yes, Bolivia says no; the US threatens to cut off economic aid but apparently can’t because Bolivia is exempt from any cutoff due to its poverty status. Bolivia says it doesn’t care either way, and won’t back down.

March 3, 2005 International Crisis Group warns of growing ties between populist coca-growing protest groups and the region’s narcotrafficantes, saying these ties are a source of regional instability.

March 4, 2005 Chavez of Venezuela backtracks on his remarks and apologizes to Bolivia, saying he had no intention of meddling in Bolivia’s internal affairs.

March 4, 2005 State Department gently warns Bolivia and Peru about rising coca production on the heels of Colombia’s successful effort to eradicate it. Bolivia’s coca production rose 6% in 2004.

March 2-5, 2005 General strikes begin in El Alto and Cochabamba, with protestors aligned with Evo Morales demanding the shutdown of a French water company’s operation because the prices it charges are too high. Infoshop, a left-leaning media source, reports:

On March 2, 2005, a general strike began in the Bolivian city of El Alto, as the population demanded the resignation of the mayor and the immediate closing of Aguas de Illimani. Thousands of people marched in the streets of El Alto and clashed with riot police the following day. In 1997, the Aguas de Illimani water company, a subsidiary of French firm Lyonnaise Des Eaux, privatized the water systems of El Alto, La Paz (the capital), and Cochabamba.

In addition, demonstrations have taken place in the city of Cochabamba, and seven major highways are blockaded across Bolivia. As of March 5, the general strike in El Alto continues.

March 6, 2005 Bolivian President Carlos Mesa announces he will resign Monday. Bolivian blogger Miguel at MABB in La Paz (see his post below) believe this could be a daring political bluff.

March 7, 2005 Popular protestors in their thousands are now filling the streets, urging President Mesa to stay. News agency EFE confirms President Mesa has high public support in the range of 60%, very high for a Latin American president. The New York Times‘ Juan Forero, (whom I’ve been critical of in the past) does an excellent job covering the story from both sides and explaining what this is all about. Bloomberg (linked at March 7) quotes Evo Morales as unexpectedly insisting that he never asked for the president’s resignation and accusing the president of blackmail. This may signal political heat on Morales, Chavez’s ally. This revolution may be flipping in Mesa’s favor.

MORE The BBC has a good Q&A sheet on turmoil in Bolivia here.

MORE Lonely Planet’s Thorn Tree bulletin board has an interesting thread of anecdotal reports from tourists and backpackers in Bolivia right now – chatter on which roads are blocked, bus lines are running, cities are accessible, etc. More here and here.

MORE If you can read Spanish – or want to see more news photos – La Razon’s news site is here.

MORE A Venezuelan blog called Devil’s Excrement (a phrase that means ‘oil’ in Venezuela) reports that Venezuela’s politicians are silent on this. DE’s Miguel notes that there has been long-running speculative, but unconfirmed, talk in Caracas that Chavez funds Morales.

MORE A Bolivian-American blog called Ciao! has the original text of President Mesa’s resignation linked. He offers very useful analysis on what Pres. Mesa’s options are and how he might play them against the Evo Morales organization’s moves.

CIAO’S MIGUEL (they are all named Miguel, must be a code name!!!) SAYS:

But let’s assume this is a play to increase popular support, win a second honeymoon period, and sweep aside Evo & FEJUVE. If so, then this is essentially a soft autogolpe. To pull this off, it means parliament must reject the resignation, essentially voting itself into irrelevancy (since from then on Mesa would govern by executive decrees, while parliament continued to squabble & play the repositioning game). It also means that Mesa’ll need to gain support from the military (perhaps also the police, but not necessary), who’ll demand from Mesa guarantees for a (relatively) free hand in establishing internal security (e.g. militarize various parts of the economy) and an agreement that he’ll not play such a stunt again (basically, force an agreement to sit in the Palacio Presidencial until 2007). In short: Mesa would remain in power, w/ greater military involvement in the decision-making & policy process, and w/ his legitimacy resting almost entirely on his ability to directly mobilize the masses. And that is a dangerous position for any prince (benevolent though he may think himself) to be.

MORE: A Bolivian blog called MABB has a quick analysis of the situation, as well as a list of demands by the socialists leading the strike.

MABB’s MIGUEL SAYS: He has just made another post regarding the situation there. He believes the president’s resignation is a play on his popularity so that he’ll be able to put a stop to the protests.

My take is this is a bold move by Mesa to fight back against those three intransigent groups trying to destabilize Bolivia’s democracy. There are several reasons to think this way. First, Mesa’s approval ratings are very high. As of January 2005, Mesa’s approval numbers in La Paz were 68%, in El Alto were 62% (a jump from Dec. 2004 of 56%), in Cochabamba were 72% and in Santa Cruz were the lowest with 16%, down from 31% in December 2004. Notwithstanding, these numbers are very high for a president, especially a Bolivian president.

Second, his seeming success in the carrying out and the outcome of the July 2004 referendum and the most celebrated December 2004 municipal elections, has given Mesa a push on his popularity. The fact that these two events were carried out in relative tranquility and relative success speak good for Mesa. Thirdly, Mesa is also relying on the spontaneous outpour of support he saw during the tense weeks after his raising the price of gasoline and diesel the first week of this year. Mainly, I think, he thinks he’s got lot of support among the population and he is determined to use it.

His resignation is an outcome not desired by many in the country and also in congress. There is a faction in congress denominated “the patriots” which includes congressmen and women from various political parties which support Mesa and what he stands for. This faction could be seen as a semi-coalition acting as the official government ally in congress.

As Mesa knows he’s got “some” support at least, he is playing all or nothing (bluffing in a sense) against Evo and Mamani. The population has now two choices. One, to continue with the protests and support Evo and Mamani’s leadership and thus walk down the path of chaos and destruction. Two, to support Mesa, let him stay in power and govern and stop doing what the civic leaders want them to do.

In the case of Santa Cruz I wouldn’t be much optimistic. The propaganda machine has worked its wonders there. It seems the crucenos have a bad opinion of Mesa and want them out. In the case of El Alto and Cochabamba, the thing is up in the air. It could go any way. On one side, there is clearly some sympathy and some degree of support for Mesa, however, the pressure exerted on the citizen by the civic organization’s machinery is considerable. The ever presence of the local government and local neighborhood federations is closer than Mesa could ever get to the average Mamani.

What will it be? It is hard to say, but If I had to guess, I would say there is a real possibility that Mesa would stay in power. On one side, there is not much support for Hormando Vaca Diez in congress. Also, he is seen as another enemy by the Altiplano side because he is from Santa Cruz. On the other side, Mesa has gained some support for him in congress and a very high percentage of the population want him to stay.

Be sure to visit his entire blog.

Here are some pictures from the El Alto strikes: