Joshua Landis, living in Damascus, has a media roundup from around the world and talks about all of the proposals. The press, for the most part, has seen this as a “great step forward” — Ba’ath words actually — in reform toward democracy in Syria. But if that sounds too good to be true, then it probably is! Perhaps it would be more appropriate to call it “the great sidestep.” Can you tell that I’m skeptical?

President Assad has to worry about international pressure and internal political pressure, both of which will relate to how he proceeds with domestic reform. A lot of the agenda for the convention is economy related, which includes partial privatization for state-owned companies in the red, better guarantees for investment, and corruption. This is an absolute must, as a long-term economic drought will direly increase resentment pinned on the government. I have no doubt that Assad will press forward on these issues to a greater degree than before.

Everything else, however, I believe it will be simply cosmetic. Now that Syria is out of Lebanon, and I agree with Josh on this, it seems that the U.S. has lost its big stick and now needs a new one. This will inevitably come from Iraq, in the form of economic and political pressure from the elected government. The U.S. itself, meanwhile, doesn’t have much leverage at the moment, so it’s a perfect time for Assad to put on some makeup (er, figuratively). The pressure has been promised, and it will come, but there is a lapse right now as that strategy is formulated. Whatever political reforms are undertaken, therefore, should be viewed with absolute skepticism in that Assad is taking advantage of the situation by consolidating his position.

For example, a proposal is being discussed to open Syria up to different political parties — as long as they are not based on any single ethnic or religious sect. This is an obvious preventative measure aimed at the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group, and the large Syrian Kurd population. Another proposed reform is the granting of citizenship to 100,000 Kurds, perfectly timed to coincide with the aforementioned now that they cannot form a political party of their own alone. In order to do so, they would have to collect tens of thousands from the different regions of Syria, and since most Kurds are in the north, that is pretty unlikely to happen.

One flaw in this plan, however, would be if the opposition can create a more broad-based coalition, like most oppositions do in authoritarian countries, in order to challenge Assad. He must be betting against that happening, and in any case, the emergency law still in effect is still not going to be revoked, effectively continuing to choke off the development of civil society. It’s not that political parties could be formed before, but the cosmetic option was made to the outside world while still finding a way to make it completely unlikely that they could emerge in a positive way.

At issue is also state corruption and the removal of the Old Guard. The vice president just resigned, saying he wants to make way for younger blood to enter the leadership positions. It seems that the part leadership will also be trimmed from a 21 man circus to only 15 — much less of a show if you ask me. Of these, only three or four will be from the Old Guard. Some “Young Guard” though, when some of the people most likely to join the group are his brother, Maher Al-Assad (Republican Guard head) and his brother-in-law Wasef Shawkat (intelligence head). With less seats in the leadership, this makes his position even more consolidated. Also, a possibility with new younger leaders, no less Ba’ath than the the rest, is that they will have to prove their command of authority to the public. Opposition activists have been a lot more outgoing since the international eye focused on Syria after Rafik Hariri’s assassination, but now that there is less leverage over the regime, the recent crackdown is likely to persist until their positions are solidified as authoritative. The current Assad was once viewed as a reformist because of his youth and partial western education, but his obvious lack of dedication to true reform is what brought fresh international criticism a few years even before the assassination of Rafik Hariri.

Government officials and Ba’ath approved newpapers are giving a lot of lip service to this event, heralding it as a big step toward reform — exactly the message that they are trying to have everyone inside and out believe. An entity as corrupt from top-to-bottom as the Ba’ath has no true reformers with enough influence to push Syria toward democratic reform. The proof in this pudding is the complete absence of invitation to true reformers and dissidents from the opposition to help in making changes. In reality, a better name for this reform might be “re-adaptation” for the Ba’ath; a complete makeover in order to consolidate any fallout while the international community is finding its next strategy.

Democracy is a process, but sometimes events can set it into motion. Don’t expect this to be it.