Israel began its “disengagement” from the Gaza Strip five weeks ago, essentially removing all Jewish settlers within a week, although the withdrawal of the IDF from all Palestinian areas was not completed for a few weeks afterward. Prior to the withdrawal, there were some, including myself, who argued that withdrawing from Gaza without an agreement with the Palestinian Authority to disarm terrorist groups – especially Hamas – would lead to not only more attacks on Israel, but increased internecine Palestinian strife, possibly even the implosion of the PA itself, requiring a bloody reoccupation by the Israeli military. (If it helps to keep these things clear in your mind, click here for a map of the Gaza Strip in pdf format.)

This post takes a close look at how things are going in the early stages of what could be the beginning of a stable, democratic Palestinian state, or (I think more likely) a descent into chaos. A key point in this process was when Israel withdrew its forces from the so-called Philadelphi Corridor, the security area between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. When this happened, order immediately broke down, and both guns and drugs flowed across the border in significant quantities (more on this below). Direct challenges have been made to PA institutions led by President Mahmud Abbas, including the assassination of Mousa Arafat, a former security chief, the desecration of Jewish synagogues, and marches in which Hamas members openly paraded with their weapons.

Border of Insecurity
First, these are some highlights from a Washington Institute for Near East Policy report, A New Reality on the Egypt-Gaza Border (Part II): Contents of the New Israel-Egypt Agreement:

…When Israel decided to leave Gaza, the Israeli defense establishment argued against departure from the Philadelphi Corridor, the narrow stretch of land along Gaza????????s Egyptian border where Israel fought the smuggling of weapons into Gaza. The concern was over the militarization of Gaza; without Israeli soldiers guarding the border, it was feared that more and new weapons systems, including antiaircraft missiles and improved rockets, could escalate the danger to Israel. No other party, it was argued, can effectively substitute for Israel????????s motivation and capability in curbing smuggling.

Ultimately, other considerations prevailed. It was clear that with continued Israeli presence, the Philadelphi Corridor would perpetuate a major source of Israeli-Palestinian friction, destabilizing the postdisengagement situation and endangering the isolated Israeli forces left behind. But perhaps the weightiest consideration was the desire to be able to claim that Israel no longer bears responsibility for Gaza, which required a complete withdrawal of forces. Egypt appeared the best available substitute, since it bears formal responsibility and possesses the best tools to stem the flow of arms from its soil…

In the course of negotiations, Egyptian negotiators tried to frame the agreement as a first phase to the eventual deployment of several thousand Egyptian troops along the entire Israel-Egypt border south of the Gaza-Egypt border. That demand raised Israeli concerns????????and added fuel to a heated public debate over the agreement????????lest the Egyptians were to undo the demilitarization of Sinai as established by the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. These concerns were met by defining the agreement as subject to the peace treaty and giving it the appearance of a procedural agreement between militaries. The Agreed Arrangements detail permitted Egyptian forces and equipment, keeping them light in nature; specify prohibitions on anything that may serve military purposes; and involve the existing Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai (MFO) as monitors of implementation. The agreement also grants Israel a veto over any further Egyptian deployment along the joint border. It should be noted that Cairo has always been careful not to fundamentally breach the military annex of the peace treaty…

What if Egypt fails to live up to its commitments under the agreement? After the Israeli departure on September 12, chaos erupted along the Egypt-Gaza border. Vast quantities of arms were smuggled into Gaza; on September 21 it is still not clear that the border has been effectively resealed, although both Egypt and the PA appear committed to sealing it. From the legal, political, and military points of view, it will be highly problematic for Israel to unilaterally abrogate the agreement with Egypt and return its forces to the Philadelphi Corridor. It is more likely that a porous border will result in a toughened Israeli stance regarding the opening and control of the other border crossings under discussion and making it harder for people and goods to enter Israel from Gaza. Here, the security concerns will be compounded by economic ones????????the collapse of the Israel-PA unified customs regime long applied along the PA????????s borders will require the establishment of a new independent Israeli customs regime along the Israel-Gaza border…

This security agreement, then, clearly impacts more than just the potential smuggling of weapons into Gaza to arm Palestinian militias. The agreement, in success or failure, will impact Israel’s broader security relationship with Egypt, as well as its economic relationship with the PA. See also Part I in the series, A New Reality on the Egypt-Gaza Border (Part I): Contents of the New Israel-Egypt Agreement which provides a more technical description of the details of the agreement, including its legal relationship to the peace treaty resulting from the Camp David Accords, composition of Egyptian forces, weapons allowed, conduct of airial and naval forces of both sides, and the role of the U.S.-led Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). Notably, the article emphasizes that in the case of any disagreement, “it will be resolved solely between Israel and Egypt, without referring to a third party.” That being a reference to the Palestinians.

The Palestinian Authority Crumbling
Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic security force, paints a bleak picture of Palestinian institutions, according to the Jerusalem Post, “PA is Crumbling, Fatah in Disarray“:

The Palestinian Authority is crumbling, its leader Mahmoud Abbas is too weak to enforce law and order, his Fatah party is in disarray and Hamas is taking control of the Gaza Strip, Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin said on Wednesday during a rare on-the-record briefing with military reporters…

“The Palestinian Authority is barely functional,” Diskin said at his headquarters in Ramat Aviv. “(Abbas) has no apparatus to control Fatah. He is a general without soldiers. Giving him more weapons won’t give Fatah strength. He needs more motivation.”

Preaching a message of doom and gloom for the prospects of a positive times ahead, Diskin said the Palestinians were making enormous efforts to acquire rockets and other weapons in the West Bank, smuggled in from the Sinai. He also said the Shin Bet believes Islamic extremists who follow an al-Qaida ideology were still targeting the Sinai resorts and that Israelis should stay out of there…

Diskin said that Hamas and other groups took advantage of the euphoric chaos after the IDF abandoned the Philadelphi corridor to smuggle in huge amounts of weapons and arms as well as return fugitives wanted for organizing terrorist attacks.

In one incident, a Hamas convoy of 15 jeeps crossed one day and returned laden with arms and explosives. According to Shin Bet data, 3,000 rifles, 1.5 million bullets, 150-200 rocket propelled grenades and hundreds of kilograms of explosives have been smuggled in so far.

But he said the Israeli Security Agency could not confirm reports that shoulder-fired Strella or Stinger missiles or advanced anti-tank rockets were also smuggled into the Gaza Strip…

References to the “Palestinian Authority” have always been misleading in a sense, because under Yasser Arafat as well, the PA did not constitute a unified administration but rather a fragmented and overlapping series of entities that Arafat kept separate to maintain power and patronage. The levers of power simply don’t seem to be there, because the society is so factionalized. So while Egyptian and Palestinian security services appear to now be making an attempt to stop the smuggling into Gaza, the situation is inherently unstable. For more links on this, see the Post‘s Special Report: Gaza Upheaval.

Ahmad al-Rabei, writing for Al-Sharq al-Awsat, gave a similar diagnosis, but suggesting a way forward (see Settling the Security Situation in Gaza (English)):

…Arabs need to move fast in order to salvage the security situation in Gaza before it is too late, and for that to happen there needs to be an Arab support fund to help develop the Gaza strip. Such a development scheme would have to be made up of a joint fund provided by Arab Governments, civil society institutions and businessmen.

There are only two routes to take here. One would be for the Palestinians to develop a humane and civilized model that would put Israel on the spot, and with the help of international pressure force it to retreat from the rest of the occupied territories. With this option, Palestinians would be able to bring about an air of optimism, and in the process ensure a better future for the next generation. This would also strengthen the Palestinians of the western bank’s will and help accelerate Israeli withdrawal.

The other route that could be pursued is that of war, power plays, missile lunches against Israel, and a return to the mantra of “Martyrdom till the end”. Unfortunately this option has already started, with masked men with their weapons on display on the streets of Gaza. This could give out the impression to the world that the Gaza strip is an unsafe place to live in, and that no one should set foot in there let alone invest and nurture. It is almost as if some people cannot accommodate the notion of peace or the option of living.

If the Palestinian authority were to be left to deal with Gaza’s turbulent status solely, it would surely fail. What is required here is for an elaborate pan-Arab political, diplomatic and financial support particularly from influential parties, because the worst-case scenario is to abandon the Palestinian authority, and allow the insubordination situation to continue.

Abdul Rahman al-Rasheed, writing in the same periodical, has an op-ed (in English) actually titled An Impending Palestinian Civil War.

The Continued Rise of Hamas
A key issue coming up is the participation of Hamas in the PA’s legislative elections in January. Abbas postponed them in the summer, it was presumed, because he feared that Hamas would win. Israel began calling for Hamas to be banned from participating, but Abbas equivocated by refusing the request while repeating his toothless demand that Hamas disarm. Raghida Dragam, writing in Al-Hayat (Arabic), writes that the Quartet – the U.S., the EU, the UN and Russia – praised Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in a recent meeting while criticizing its settlements in Gaza, which have been both expanded and pulled back in different locations recently. The Quartet also emphasized that “armed action cannot be part of the electoral process.” It is probably worth noting in this connection, then, that it is all over the Arab media that Hamas might consider negotiating away its commitment to the destruction of Israel (see also this Reuters version in English). Analyzed closely, however, this is meaningless since (a) such negotiations are dependent on allowing the right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel, leading to Israel’s destruction at the ballot box, and (b) they were in any case contradicted by recent statements by Hamas leaders in Gaza to the contrary – Hamas would never give up destroying Israel. Note especially this source cited by Eurabian Times which quotes Hamas leaders as saying that if they are excluded from Palestinian elections, they will simply set up their own government, and there will be parallel institutions.

This last issue of Hamas’ parallel institutions – which are already in existence to a large degree – would bring us to the point of a Palestinian civil war that so many of us have been predicting. Israel is now in a position of deciding just how bad things have to get before they step back in, leading to a major Israeli-Palestinian war (i.e. Do we wait until Hamas has taken over? Or intervene if it just looks like they might?). Hamas will have an incentive to keep things quite until January so as to consolidate their power, and if the PA breaks up into a series of armed gangs, Hamas could be the dominant power by early next year. Lastly, and sad to say, but the United States has basically abdicated any useful role here, supporting Sharon’s actions without question, continuing funding for the Palestinian Authority without accountability, and with Secretary of State Rice repeating meaningless statements about how wonderful the disengagement plan was, and how the PA just needs to disarm those terrorists in Hamas. Meanwhile, the power of the undisarmed Hamas continues to grow.

Contributed by Kirk H. Sowell of Arab World Analysis.com