The United Nations has issued another report regarding the situation between Lebanon and Syria, which takes notice of Syrian actions above and beyond that of the assassination of ex-PM Hariri as laid out in the Mehlis Report. The Larsen report, prepared by UN envoy Terje Roed-Larsen for the purpose of measuring the success of implementing resolution 1559, warns about an increase of arms flow from Syria to Palestinian camps, as well as the continued presence of Syria-backed Hizb’allah and the economic pressures that Syria is trying to exert on Lebanon. The full text is here, and here are the relevant parts about Syrian involvement.

39. Besides Hizbullah, as I stated in my report to the Council of 1 October 2004, there are Palestinian militias in Lebanon. Such armed groups have enjoyed relative autonomy inside Palestinian refugee camps, which the Lebanese authorities do not generally enter. While there has been no fundamental change in the status of such groups, a variety of recent reports has suggested that there has been an increasing influx of weaponry and personnel from Syria to some of these groups. The issue has also been raised with me by a number of senior Lebanese and other officials. The Government of Syria has informed me that smuggling

of arms and people across the Syrian-Lebanese border does indeed take place, albeit in

both directions.

40. The Government of Lebanon has informed me that it has undertaken significant measures towards restricting such an influx of arms and people and the free movement of weaponry and armed elements to and from the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon in recent weeks, in particular since the end of September 2005. The Lebanese Armed Forces enhanced their deployment along the border with Syria and increased both mechanized and foot patrols. The Government of Lebanon has also informed that the Lebanese Armed Forces further increased their presence, erected new checkpoints, and tightened controls around positions of Palestinian armed groups headquartered in Syria to the south of Beirut and in the Beqaa Valley. On 7 October, the Lebanese army conducted raids against posts held by Syrian-headquartered Palestinian armed groups in the Beqaa Valley, in the course of which weapons were seized. The Government of Lebanon has informed me that the Lebanese Armed Forces also detained and deported a number of infiltrators of Palestinian origin who carried Syrian identification documents.
…
55. Complications have also unfortunately arisen from the lack of a clearly agreed upon and demarcated border between Lebanon and Syria, and have highlighted the need for a formal border agreement and demarcation of that border on the ground between the two countries. There were not only difficulties related to the verification of the full Syrian withdrawal, given the presence of a Syrian army battalion at Deir al-Ashayr at a location that the United Nations found impossible to determine as Lebanese or as Syrian territory. There have also been difficulties related to the control of the borderline between Lebanon and Syria, and the issue of the illegal transfer of arms and people towards armed Palestinian groups in Lebanon, which has threatened to cast a shadow on the efforts aimed at bolstering Lebanon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence. I reiterate my expectation that a formalization of bilateral relations would contribute significantly to alleviate such concerns. I welcome Prime Minister Seniora’s statement to me on 17 October that he favors the establishment of mutual diplomatic missions and that bilateral talks on the issue should resume as soon as possible.
…
58. I was greatly concerned when shortly after the withdrawal of Syrian troops, military assets and the intelligence apparatus, Syria closed its border with Lebanon to Lebanese truck drivers. The closure of the border had considerable effects on the Lebanese economy, which remains in a difficult situation and can only recover with the help of all regional and international partners of Lebanon. I was relieved when the Governments of Syria and Lebanon resolved the crisis after a few weeks.
…
61. Whilst an internal dialogue on the issue of the arms of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in Lebanon has begun, there remain a number of fundamental concerns. As I have noted, a group engaged in the democratic political process of opinion formation and decision-making cannot simultaneously possess an autonomous armed operational capacity outside the authority of the state. More broadly, the existence of armed groups defying the control of the legitimate government, which by definition is vested with a monopoly on the use of force throughout its territory, is incompatible with the restoration and full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of the country.

The weapons are coming from Syria through the Bekaa Valley, by no coincidence the area where Syria has always had the most control. It has been known for a long time as a growing ground for the illicit drugs and arms trade, but it’s coming to a spotlight now that Lebanon is becoming fully sovereign and is having to deal with these issues left over from the occupation by Syria. This arms smuggling is an obvious attempt at sowing further discord in Lebanon, but the Lebanese Army seems to be taking a huge step forward by completely surrounding the Palestinian camps to make sure that they can’t themselves cause havoc.

The report also takes shot at Syria’s border closing that started back in late June and lasted for several week. It stopped trade of Lebanese goods almost completely, in what was an overt attempt to punish Lebanon. It also noted, of course, the more than a dozen car bombs that have been unleashed since the withdrawal of Syrian troops.

This is a double-whammy for the U.S.-French-British alliance in the UN for pressuring Syria into fully cooperating with the Mehlis investigation; which was bad enough for Assad already, but this will give an even stronger pulse to their demands.

However, at the moment, Russia, China, Algeria, and even the Lebanese government do not want sanctions imposed on Syria at this time. For the former three, they simply want to prolong this process as long as possible in what is an encroachment onto their territory, saying that we should wait for the full report to come out in September. It seems to have weakened the call for sanctions, in any case. What we’ll likely see now is a UN resolution that will demand the Syrian government, perhaps including Assad himself, cooperate completely with the rest of the Mehlis investigation and then it will face sanctions if it does not. Lebanon wants an international tribunal to try those indicted by the report, and if their calculations are correct about what the full report could entail, then it should in the end be a trial of every top member of the regime.

If that happens, Assad definitely won’t put himself up for trial, and the country will face sanctions unless Russia and China go against world opinion and veto a resolution anyhow. Now that the EU is behind a resolution calling for Assad to cooperate, a Russia-China veto post-investigation would be another step in the ongoing polarization of the free and unfree worlds. In that, what may be even more important than finding ways to make Syria cooperate — which it won’t — will be finding a way to make sure that Russia and China are in a position where they have to ditch the dictator.