This article will discuss the recently concluded Cairo conference of “national reconciliation” mostly as it was seen through the Arab media. The result is perhaps best summed up by Al-Hayat‘s headline on Nov. 22: “Cairo Conference: A Pass on American Withdrawal and Agreement on the ‘Legitimacy of Resistance’ and Rejection of ‘Terrorism’.” According to the same article, the final statement provided that Iraq sought “the withdrawal of foreign forces according to a fixed timetable, and the immediate establishment of a national program to rebuild the national security forces with regard to training, weapons and numbers on a peaceful basis, empowering them to project its borders and to exercise control over its security…” Although this conference was only meant to be in preparation for a more conclusive conference set for February in Baghdad, it nevertheless represented an attempt to compromise as far as the government could with the Sunnis and still maintain the state’s right to defend itself.

It is of concern that the conference legitimized so-called “resistance,” but, according to al-Hayat, it also rejected wording sought by Sunnis which would have explicitly sanctioned “resistance… in the shadow of the occupation.” Moreover, statements from leading Shia officials made clear that they interpreted the Iraqi “resistance” to be the current government and its fight against the insurgents. The fact that joint U.S.-Iraqi operations have continued this week makes clear that this is precisely their interpretation of what was agreed upon, to the extent to which there really was any agreement.

The final section of this post will focus on the campaign for parliament in December, which is finally shaping up. Based on current reporting, it seems that Iyad Allawi’s non-sectarian approach will likely increase his party’s representation, and it may even bring him back into leadership of the government, or at least put him in a position to have more leverage as part of a new coalition government.

An Ominous Beginning
The beginning of the conference was overshadowed by accusations of the use of torture against the Iraqi Interior Ministry after U.S. forces discovered that members of the Badr Organization, formerly the Badr Corps, the armed wing of the SCIRI, leading faction in the Iraqi government, had abused several Sunni prisoners. Interior Minister Bayan Jabr Solagh downplayed the accusations, emphasizing that those held in this case were terrorists who had murdered innocents, and asserting that there were only seven genuine cases (Al-Hayat). Nevertheless, Sunni leaders called for an international investigation, and the incident left a pale over the proceedings. Al-Hayat also reported that Arab League General Secretary Amr Musa deliberately aimed to lower expectations by emphasizing that this was a preparatory meeting.

This is an excerpt from a Radio Liberty report:

…Arab League Secretary-General Amr Musa invited about 100 Iraqi leaders to the gathering. Eight Arab foreign ministers, members of a special working group on Iraq, will attend the weekend meeting, along with envoys from the United States, Europe, Iran and the United Nations.

Yahia Said, a researcher on Iraq and other transitional nations at the London School of Economics, said it is important for the Arab League to appear to become more involved in building reconciliation in Iraq…

Shi’ites have been skeptical of the conference from the start and have strongly opposed participation by Sunni Arab officials from the regime of former leader Saddam Hussein or from pro-insurgency groups.

Musa traveled to Iraq in October — his first visit since Saddam Hussein was ousted in early 2003 — and encountered sharp criticism from Shi’ite leaders, who said the Arab League was acting too late to help in the Iraqi conflict and had failed to condemn attacks by Sunni-led insurgents…

Neither Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, the head of SCIRI, Iraq’s dominant faction, or Moqtada Sadr, the leader of the militant faction among the Shia, attended, and Prime Minister Jaafari, a member of SCIRI, blocked Sunnis tainted by Saddam’s regime from attendnig, and these factors combined to cast doubt on prospects. For further reports in English prior to the conference, see Radio Liberty reports Iraq: Sunni-Shi’ite Tensions High on Eve of Arab Conference and Iraq: Resistance Ready to Talk – But Only With the U.S.

Reactions & Continuing Operations
The final result of the conference was reported with each side giving its spin on the true meaning of the final statement. Al-Quds, which normally has a strong anti-American bent, emphasized that the conference “recognizes the right of resistance” and “demands a fixed timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces.” Its front-page article actually contained more information than the Al-Hayat article linked above, including that the statement demanded a reduction in Iraq’s debt from other Arab countries, and encouraged them to become more involved diplomatically. Yet it failed to mention that the conference specifically rejected language legitimizing “resistance” against American-led forces in the country.

Prime Minister Jaafari, by contrast, presented to the result as an endorsement of the current Iraqi government. As reported in Al-Sharq al-Awsat on Nov. 22 (“Jaafari: The Nationalist Resistance is the Leadership of Iraq Now,” by Haydr Najim), Jaafari stated that “the nationalist resistance is constituted by the protection of the wealth of the country and its exploitation without exposing it to destruction… it stands shoulder-to-shoulder with the children of its people through this trial and does not target them or expose innocents among them to danger… ” Jaafari mocked insurgents who called themselves “resistance” by asking rhetorically “where was this resistance” during the time of Saddam Hussein? “The resistance, they are now the leaders of the country.” This last statement was a veiled reference to the fact that Jaafari’s group had opposed Saddam and had been forced to leave the country, suggesting that they, once in resistance outside, had now returned to lead.

Meanwhile, joint U.S.-Iraqi operations have continued. With Operation Steel Curtain drawing to a close, coalition forces began moving on Bayji Island, a terrorist hideout on the Tigris north of Tikrit which had apparently gone untouched previously. Iraqi forces took over control of a forward operating base in Tikrit from U.S. forces there. (Threats Watch) Terrorist attacks continue against civilian targets, while Reuters reports that Sunnis are looking to correct past mistakes by participating in parliamentary elections in three weeks.

The Compaign’s Major Trends
A Nov. 22 article in Al-Hayat delineated the campaign strategy of the major parties (“The Sunni Lists Focus Their Campaigns in the Western Regions and Allawi is the Only Competitor to the UIA in the Shia Cities,” Arabic-proficient readers should note that I’ve lost the precise link, but the article was written by Khulud al-Amri). The article reports that the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), which is the ruling party, has focused its efforts on cities where the Shia are the majority, as well as cities with a mixed Shia-Sunni population, and that they face competition in these cities from the

liberal faction which is led by former prime minister Iyad Allawi which has begun to move with greater freedom than the UIA in Sunni cities like Mosul and Tikrit because of the presence of Sunni candidates on his electoral list representing these cities, while the Kurdistan area remained closed, reinforcing the Kurdish list.

The report further notes that Salih Matlik, head of the Sunni Front for Iraqi National Dialogue (which participated in the Cairo conference and agreed to the final statement with reservations), has confirmed that his organization is focusing on the cities of the Anbar, Kut, Mosul, Tikrit and Baquba. He stated that the Shia areas in the south were effectively closed to them, arguing that the sectarian character of the current leadership made it difficult for parties from other parts of the country to make inroads. However, the article quotes Azat Shabandar, an advisor to Allawi and his Iraqi National Front, as emphasizing that both central and south Iraq were open to them, as they had no ties to any specific religious school of thought, and that their diverse list was able to openly campaign in most Iraqi cities. The article concludes by dealing with warnings from officials about the giving of gifts for votes or the use of violence in the run up to the election.

This election, then, is likely to shape up somewhat differently than the one in January – the Sunnis will do better, and have more representation, Allawi’s group, which had 14% before, will likely do better, and the UIA, while likely to still receive the largest share of the vote, will come in well below their 48% of the vote they received last time (this impression is also based on polls I have seen in previous reports, which showed UIA support slipping). Since the Kurdish parties will likely do about as well in absolute terms, their percentage of the vote will likely drop somewhat from the roughly 25% they achieved previously.

The Final Analysis
If the discussion of the implication of the Cairo conference were a lawsuit over the meaning of a contract, the likely conclusion would be that there was no contract at all. For there to be a contract, there must be mutual agreement as to specified terms. Here it seems that in regard to the key terms there is complete disagreement as to their meaning – the insurgents and the government both think that they are the “resistance.” I’m sure there is agreement on some of the other issues – all Iraqis, no doubt, would like to see other Arab countries forgive debts taken out on their behalf by Saddam Hussein, and there has been growing concern among even anti-American Sunnis about Zarqawi’s practice of targeting Iraqi civilians. Yet there should be no question that our Sunni opponents, whatever they call themselves, are criminals. American forces are the allies of the legitimate government of Iraq, and those who attack them are terrorists. It would be like as if an American gang from Chicago were to attack and kill foreign soldiers invited to the United States for some purpose considered important by Washington.

This is not to suggest that compromise with the enemy is impossible. The illegitimacy of an enemy’s cause does should not preclude negotiation as long as the end result is their disarmament. Jaafari has strenuously resisted including former Baathists in the government, and it is understandable why he feels this way, but the approach advocated by Allawi – as well as some U.S. military officials – of integrating former Baathists into the new system is necessary. There is a certain level of culpability which cannot be forgiven – essentially those with discretionary authority over the killing of innocents – but culpability for wrongdoing is spread so wide within the Sunni minority, due to how much the regime depended on them, that a refusal to grant a partial amnesty would be an obstacle of peace. We are already hearing now more indications that Sunni insurgent groups are seeking reconciliation. This is surely the way forward if they are acting in good faith.

Kirk H. Sowell, Arab World Analysis.com