It was Mao Zedong who first said that, as long as a population remains neutral to an insurgency, the ultimate war against a government could be won. He layed out a three-pronged strategy for victory, which consisted of the preparation of an underground infrastructure, limited guerilla warfare, and eventually conventional warfare that would lead to victory. The most important of these stages is the first two, in which the insurgency lays the groundwork for mainstream support among the population so that it can begin engaging in operations. Writing in 1988 for the Airpower Research Institute, Colonel Dennis M. Drew evaluates the effectiveness of a well-organized insurgency and how its victory depends on the battle for the population. (Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals)

If the proselytizing efforts of the insurgent underground succeed and the infrastructure spreads through the population, the government is weakened. In addition, as it spreads through the society, the infrastructure taps into a larger and larger manpower pool from which to draw recruits (volunteers and “conscripts”) for the rebel armed forces. This phenomenon explains why it is possible for the size of the rebel military forces to increase in spite of heavy casualties inflicted by government forces. Indeed, if the government concentrates its attention on subduing the insurgent military threat, it provides the infrastructure with the opportunity to grow unimpeded; thus exacerbating the government’s military problem.

A brief overview of the history of Iraq since its liberation in 2003 shows, in the beginning, a strong foothold by insurgents and their foreign collaborators in several parts of the country. The best example would be Fallujah, where the number of armed insurgents was so massive that they effectively controlled the entire city until American and newly trained Iraqi troops were able to take the city back militarily. Operations in Fallujah and similar ones like it were defeats for the insurgents, but as Mao also demonstrated, an insurgency can lose every battle yet still win the war.

In the heart of 2004, it appeared to many that this is exactly what was happening. Everything was going right for the insurgents despite being defeated when directly engaging coalition forces. Their finances and arms smuggling from abroad were limitless; the population supportive or neutral in the Sunni Triangle; and their ranks swelling with sympathizers from both inside and outside the country. Insurgent groups capitalized on this by using their superior intelligence-gathering skills to broaden guerilla attacks against military and foreign targets, which helped legitimize their cause. A tight bond of common cause had developed between the homebred insurgents and their foreign jihadi counterparts.

Meanwhile, coalition forces seemed to be trying to hook a couple of sharks in a sea of oversized fish. Even though they were given the option, people were not reporting insurgents to the authorities anonymously. Having to take shots in the dark only further isolated the mainstream Sunni community from Iraqi society as a whole as the reults of doing so tended to be messy. Looking back a year later, a lot of bets were hedged on hope alone. According to GlobalSecurity.Org:

The insurgency in Iraq has grown in size and complexity over the course of 2004. Attacks numbered approximately 25 per day at the beginning of 2004, and averaged in the 60s by the end of the year. Insurgents demonstrated their ability to increase attacks around key events such as the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) transfer of power, Ramadan and the January 2005 election. Attacks on Iraq????????s election day reached approximately 300, double the previous one day high of approximately 150 reached during Ramadan 2004.

The pattern of attacks remains the same as in 2004. Approximately 80% of all attacks occur in Sunni-dominated central Iraq. The Kurdish north and Shia south remain relatively calm. Coalition Forces continue to be the primary targets. Iraqi Security Forces and Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) officials are attacked to intimidate the Iraqi people and undermine control and legitimacy. Attacks against foreign nationals are intended to intimidate non-government organizations and contractors and inhibit reconstruction and economic recovery. Attacks against the country????????s infrastructure, especially electricity and the oil industry, are intended to stall economic recovery, increase popular discontent and further undermine support for the IIG and Coalition.
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In January 2005 Iraqi intelligence service director General Mohamed Abdullah Shahwani said that Iraq’s insurgency consited of at least 40,000 hardcore fighters, out of a total of more than 200,000 part-time fighters and volunteers who provide intelligence, logistics and shelter. Shahwani said the resistance enjoyed wide backing in the Sunni provinces of Baghdad, Babel, Salahuddin, Diyala, Nineveh and Tamim. Shahwani said the Baath, with a core fighting strength of more than 20,000, had split into three factions. The main one, still owing allegiance to jailed dictator Saddam Hussein, is operating out of Syria. It is led by Saddam’s half-brother Sabawi Ibrahim al-Hassan and former aide Mohamed Yunis al-Ahmed, who provide funding to their connections in Mosul, Samarra, Baquba, Kirkuk and Tikrit. Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri is still in Iraq. Two other factions have broken from Saddam, but have yet to mount any attacks. Islamist factions range from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda affiliate to Ansar al-Sunna and Ansar al-Islam.

The National Assembly election to draft a constitution on January 30, 2005, the first in the nation’s history, was met with tears of joy both in America and in Iraq. But it was paralleled by a massive Sunni boycott, a signal that the community at large did not believe in the political process and that fighting was the only means by which to protect their interests. The months that followed, counted by day after tense day, left memories of Yugoslavia over If a neutral population is all that was needed for the insurgency to win, what might this mean for the coalition’s odds at building a unified and peaceful Iraq? How could a complacent and often hostile segment of the population be convinced to become an active supporter of the government?

*****

Between now and then, the dynamics of the war have changed completely.

On November 30, 2005, the White House released the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, a general outline overviewing the strategies that are being employed in order to ensure a stable and democratic state in Iraq; a goal that requires the ultimate defeat of the insurgency by winning the hearts and minds of the people. Rightly, it identifies the insurgency as consisting of three parts: the large portion of passive sympathizers that can be won over, a small percentage of former Baathists who cannot be won over, and an even smaller percentage of foreign fighters who will die for their cause. The strategy is to divide the insurgency by winning over the first category of insurgents while marginalizing the latter two.

The Iraqi government has fully engaged the mainstream Sunni resistance since the election in January. Though they procured no allotment of seats in the country’s first parliament, the religious Shia and Kurd dominated National Assembly approved the appointment of several Sunni representatives to the constitution drafting committees. In the run up to the October referendum on its approval, they made several more concessions to the Sunni community on a variety of issues from federalism to the status of former Baath Party members. While ultimately voting “no” to the constitution in droves, these intense political wranglings had the effect of giving the Sunnis confidence in the unfolding political process that they were engaging.

The marked departure between the mainstream insurgency and the foreign jihadis began here, as it became wildly apparent that, while both wanted coalition forces to leave Iraq, the latter were willing to sacrifice anyone and anything to achieve that goal. These militants have become much more reckless in their attacks, often killing dozens of civilians at a time, while threatening to kill anyone who votes or colludes with the coalition and Iraqi government.

The result has been a disaster for the armed insurgency. The month’s preceding the December 15, 2005, parliamentary elections have seen dozens of instances of “red-on-red” fire, with Sunni fighters attacking Al Qaeda fighters in running street battles. In Ramadi, home to one of Iraq’s largest insurgent populations, fights between the two break out almost daily. It can now be said that, with the passing of the December elections, the Sunnis have at large broken away from their foreign counter-parts and become engaged with the political process. There is now a defineable difference between the insurgents and the terrorists. Ramadi witnessed Sunni gunmen taking it upon themselves to protect voters from attacks, while cities like Fallujah and Barwana, once typically associated with violence and election boycotting, saw mosque speakers being used as get-out-the-vote commercials.

The Sunnis, now fully engaged in the political process while arming themselves against non-American foreigners, have lifted themselves of their fear and expressed an as yet unseen hope in the future of their country (See: Freedom From Fear Lifts Sunnis). At the same time, insurgent groups are prepared to begin negotiations with the United States in hopes of reaching a mutally beneficial deal that would end the violence by mainstream insurgents (See: Insurgents Seek to Negotiate with U.S.). Is it all simply a coincidence that this is all happening around Iraq’s first representative parliamentary election?

The United States and the Iraqi government have now fully engaged the insurgency and brought the Sunnis into the political process. They are now no longer a complacent population, but one beginning to actively fight the terrorists themselves. The terrorists themselves, meanwhile, are on the run and desperately trying to recover favor. Because if they don’t, and do it soon, it will mean that they will no longer have a place to hide. The sea that they swim in is drying up quick.

The insurgency is whithering on the vine. It’s views, like all others, will be moderated in the process of engaging in political life. The foreign jihadis and Saddamists, meanwhile, are being rooted out or given up one by one. The December 15 elections were no doubt a major turning point in the war, marking the beginning of the end of Iraq’s popular insurgency. What happens now must be the continued buildup of momentum toward this end, yet it cannot be achieved militarily. It will only occur through the continued reconstruction of the economy, the sophistication of the parliament, the building of genuine institutions, and the weeding out of corruption. Even though it will take years to accomplish this, the odds have tipped inexorably against the armed insurgency.

I do not want to seem premature in declaring this, like President Bush was when he declared victory aboard a naval carrier on May 1, 2003. But I will take that risk. December 15, 2005, will be seen as not only an historic election, but the day that combat operations really did begin to come to an end. Dare we say, “Mission Accomplished?”

Further Reading:
???????Clear, Hold, and Build????????: The Way ahead in Iraq
Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency
Speak No Evil: Targeting a Nation’s Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency