The gas crisis that has shaken relations between the Ukraine, Russia, and the European Union is now over. The air is clearing, but whatever the politicians are saying now, the damage has been done. So the question begs: who came out on top of this? Or perhaps we should be asking who came out on bottom, and though the answer may seem counter-intuitive at first, the answer is Russia.

President Putin was embarrassed late last year when his favored candidated in the Ukrainian presidential election, Viktor Yanukovich, was defeated by pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko following the Orange Revolution. Demand for a five-fold price increase for gas shipments to the Ukraine by Gazprom, Russia’s natural gas monopoly, was a blatant show of the country’s newfound economic might and an attempt to once again influence Ukrainian politics before the March parliamentary elections. The changes scheduled to take place will strip Yushchenko of his ability to choose the prime minister, and should Putin’s plan go as expected, the people of Ukraine will feel that the Orange government has failed and vote in a new parliament that will re-embrace Russia in exchange for the fringe benefits — like cheap gas — that comes with it. If this plan worked, Putin would be the one getting the last laugh for sure.

But Putin seems to have disregarded even recent history. Those most affected by the gas shortage were the industrial centers of the east, areas already heavily pro-Russia. They blame the Orange government for the crisis, but it is of no consequence come election day, as the only direction that Russia’s support there can go is down. On the other hand, the meddling has heavily re-energized the pro-West Ukrainian nationalist movement. The majority of Ukrainians would rather fight the good fight and go a little cold in the winter than surrender their country’s independence and integrity to a government that won’t stop meddling in their affairs. If all of Ukrainian history is any precedent, Putin will see himself experiencing another huge backlash in his near-abroad.

Meanwhile, Russia now faces another foreign relations disaster; perhaps the biggest one since he first came to power. The politicization of energy became blatantly apparent when Gazprom, which also owns the pipelines themselves, refused to deliver gas pre-purchased by the Ukraine from Turkmenistan. The, the slowdown of gas output to Europe, and the fact that it was done out of purely political reasons, has caused the entire continent to reconsider Russia’s reliability as a provider of crucial energy resources. It receives 50% of its gas from Russia, 80% of which comes through Ukrainian pipelines, and this fact is forcing Europe to rethink its energy portfolio. As they say: diversify! President Yushchenko over in the Ukraine, taking the lead, has ordered his government to achieve energy independence from Russia within four years. And Germany, one of Russia’s biggest allies, is taking another look at nuclear energy.

What began as a project to boost Russia’s prominence on the world stage is eroding into the predictable turndown of a country under authoritarian management.