Putin has okayed the return of the Sarospatak Library, seized by the Nazis and then by the Russians in WWII. Of course, this raises some eyebrows over the larger repatriation issues, even if the Russian official media feel the need to demonstrate that no new repatriation precedents are being set with the move. Given this, it’s no big surprise that Hungary has agreed to pay the Russians for “storage costs” that Putin’s buds can then turn around and tout as a foreign-policy success.

So, what’s going on?

A couple of things, as I see it. One, Putin is getting set to try to seriously normalize political ties with Poland and Hungary, the latter of which is pretty irritated over the gas shortages earlier this winter, and the former of whom has had badly-strained ties ever since they managed to get out from under the Pact, but especially given Poland’s support for the Orange Revolution and serious animosity with the ruling regime in Belarus.

It would come as no great shock to any of Publius’ readers to hear that the Poles and Hungarians are generally more sympathetic to the Ukrainians than to the Russians when it comes to near-neighbor relations. So it is equally obvious that Putin needs to equalize the equation a bit.

One way Putin can do that is by setting up some quid-pro-quo with the Polish and Hungarian governments. How that would be arranged with the Poles, I don’t know. But the MSZP (Socialists) are in trouble electorally: with even bird flu being used as ammunition in the traditionally-apoplectic Hungarian political scene, polls put them just slightly behind FIDESZ, when what they need in order to push through reforms is a convincing victory. Now, as covered before, neither party adheres perfectly to a left-wing/right-wing shorthand as we would know it in the US: the MSZP’s economic policy, for example, is vastly less populist, than, say, the Democrats, and FIDESZ has no systematic economic policy beyond what they think will sell in the next round of polls (for instance, Magyar Nemzet* reports that FIDESZ wants to end “laissez-faire capitalism” — a stance that is scaring small businessmen and possibly losing FIDESZ as many votes as it gains them).

But the MSZP’s history of antagonizing the Hungarian churches and other bastions of traditional culture, on the other hand, is long-established. Hungarians who support “traditional culture” by and large despise the Socialists, and the latter have earned each and every forint and filler of that hatred. Long-term, this puts the MSZP in a bind: they’re no longer the Communists of the past (though many powerful figures in the party still are, as many anti-MSZP Hungarians are quick to point out), and in order to have any chance at developing themselves as a credible governing party for the future, the Socialists will have to figure out how to defuse the anger they’ve earned for years of typically repressive left-wing governance.

Managing the return of the Sarospatak library to the Calvinists is one obvious move in that direction: this is a Big Deal(tm). Equally, Tony Blair’s recent visit for the MSZP’s party meeting, and the potential for Bush to attend this year’s 1956 anniversary celebrations, all theoretically hold out some hope for buoying up MSZP’s numbers among educated but undecided voters, and the Prime Minister’s blog possibly a bump among the younger ones. If Putin gets a slight reputation boost during his upcoming Central European trip and some local museum funds in exchange for potentially helping to give the MSZP the electoral edge it needs to hold onto power… then all sides of the equation benefit.

This isn’t a sure analysis, by any stretch — reading into tea leaves might be more accurate. But if it bears out, look for some similar initiative to be announced in the Russian press regarding Poland, whose minority government is having troubles of its own.

*hat tip: Hungary around the clock.