Belarus goes to the polls on March 19 to elect a president. All indication shows that the incumbent, Alexander Grigoryevich Lukashenko, will win reelection by way of genuine popularity and repression against the population. Lukashenko was first elected in 1994 on a vague populist platform which gave him 80 percent of the vote in a fair election. Beginning in 1996, he used a combination of legislative moves and repression to solidify his power. NGOs, human rights organizations, oppostition parties and civil society groups are all under a stiff arm of real or threatened repression. Belarus is now considered by many to be an authoritarian regime.

Things were made worse in January when civil offenses were placed under the criminal code. According to one article (396-1) such offenses as “discrediting the Republic of Belarus” such as the “fraudulent representation of the Republic of Belarus and its government agencies” pose a serious problem for the pro-democracy movement for “fraudulent representation” is in the eye of the beholder and there is no doubt that the beholder is Lukashenko himself.

According to a recent article in Le Monde diplomatique, it would be wrong to think of Lukashenko’s regime was the return of the Soviet repressed. This of course has not prevented the use of the Stalinist boogeyman to stir up fear. Instead, it is merely the nostalgia for it. As one former university professor cited in the article says, Lukashenko’s government is “just keeping up a Soviet-style facade, behind which lies a new kind of statist system. It is all based on state ideology, a doctrine that they have to teach now in universities. And an ideological director has been assigned to every factory. But this is a meaningless concept. Unlike in the USSR, state ideology has no real impact on reality. And unlike communism, it has no vision for the future.”

Yet all of this has not completely stifled the opposition which is composed of a coalition of over ten organizations with Alexander Milinkevich as their candidate. But, as the Le Monde diplomatique article argues, there is little possibility that the Opposition will win even with the predicted international denunciation of the elections.

What is interesting about the upcoming election is not that it that it will be yet another falsified election in a former Soviet republic; it is the fact that it will serve as yet another example of how the specter of colored revolutions still hangs over the region. Like in the Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, the Belarusian Opposition also hopes to orchestrate a “Denim Revolution” and rid the country of Lukashenko’s iron grip.

So “colored revolution” is once again in the air and in the press. And if past narratives of its prospects are any indication, youth and youth organizations will play a prominent and decisive role. How could anyone forget the scenes of Pora’s activists occupying the streets in the Ukraine? Or Kmara’s street protests in Georgia? Or KelKel’s organizing youths to vote in Kyrgyzstan? In many ways colored revolutions are youth revolutions.

In fact, the Belarusian Opposition youth organization Zubr (Bison) coined the label “Denim Revolution” from the blue denim that serves as its symbol. It is suspected that Zubr has connections to Pora and Kmara, thus increasing the specter of colored revolution. Over the last several weeks Zubr activists have been subject to arrest, imprisonment, searches, expulsion from university, and physical attack.

But the problem that I always have with the reporting on the coming “colored Revolution” is to finding any information about what groups like Zubr stand for.

Judging from Zubr’s website, the only documents that approach a program are an activist manual (available only in Russian) and a paper by Gene Sharp called “From Dictatorship to Democracy.” The paper is available in both English and Belorussian.

Sharp’s essay lays out a broad strategy for non-violent democratic political resistance. Its central problematic is developing a strategy that stands firm against dictatorships to prevent cooptation while at the same time developing democratic consciousness through activism.

The activist manual is a fascinating document. It lays out the activist methodology and structure of Zubr. It gives precise instructions and examples on organizing protest actions. Like many youth groups, Zubr’s political ideology is centered on a belief in the effectiveness of mass protest and organizing, strong ties to non-government organizations, the development of civil society, and networking and participating in broad coalitions. These, according to the document, appear to be the seeds of a democratic society. However, in the meantime, their main concern is a Belarus without Lukashenko.

Thus, Zubr’s purpose and structure is well known to those in the anti-globalization movement, which is composed of similar, though for the most part less vertically structured organizations. An ideology based on civil society acts as the main ideological tenet. (For an interesting critique of this ideology see Emir Sadir’s “Beyong Civil Society” in the New Left Review) My fear is that beyond utopian aspirations for democracy, civil society, and an end of corruption, Zubr, like many youth organizations of their ilk, offer little by way of concrete policies.

This is a general problem of many youth based organizations in the Former Soviet Union and in the anti-globalization movement. Their politics are based in being reactive rather than proactive. This is evident in the emphasis on protest and resistance. This emphasis will eventually pose a question that seems to have appeared in the Ukraine and Georgia–what to do if they actually win? For the most part the question has split the Ukraine’s Pora into two–a political party wing and a watchdog wing. This is unlikely to be an immediate problem in Belarus since most doubt the Opposition will be able to unseat Lukashenko through electoral or extra-electoral means.

But the question is one that organizations must consider. As anti-war and anti-globalization movements in the West have proved, mass protest has limits. A perpetual reliance on it, let alone fetishizing it, can become rote, predictable, and eventually demoralizing.

That said the elections in Belarus will be the first in a continuing battle against Lukashenko’s power. And at this point in the struggle, mass protest seems to be an effective means of resistance given the State’s violent response to it. And if mass protests around or on the election occurs and Lukashenko uses violence to crush them, the Opposition could gain the sympathy of public opinion. This could prove to be vital blow to Lukashenko’s premature undoing.