Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak recently ruffled feathers in the Arab world when he publically questioned the loyalty of Arab Shiites not only to the Arab nation, but also to their own homelands. “Most of the Shiites are loyal to Iran, and not the countries they are living in,” he said. Such fears in the Arab East are long standing and often taken in a very matter of fact way when the region????????s Sunnis look at their Shiite neighbors???????? affinity for portraits of Iranian political leaders and mosques built with Iranian funds. Suspicion among the region????????s various groups has only been exasperated by the American invasion of Iraq and the subsequent Shiite dominated government with its many ties to Tehran and its regional organizations. The party of Iraq????????s Prime Minister, Ibrahim al-Jafaari, ad-Daawa had many connection to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and a great number of the leaders of the United Iraqi Alliance were given refuge in the Islamic Republic during the dark years of the Baéath. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the most powerful political party in Iraq, was formed in part in Iran by Iraqi exiles. Is it not surprising then that Sunni Arabs fear losing their influence in Iraq, once the heartland of the Arab nation to those dastardly Persians?

These fears, whether or not they have any foundation, do not seem to be helping the Sunni cause. Mubarak????????s comments alienated the new Iraqi government, causing it to boycott the latest Arab League meeting in Cairo. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the situation in Iraq.

Mubarak????????s comments have highlighted bigotry and paranoia that has lingered in the Arab East for centuries. The looming threat of that great and arrogant power of Ajam, that was held at bay by the efforts of Saddam Hussein, has been empowered by the American invasion of Iraq. What ever is a Sunni oil sheikh or xenophobic republican to do?

Iran is a massive power in the Middle East. With about 69 million people, and the world????????s 6th largest military (not including the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps), Iran out numbers all other Middle Eastern populations (except for Turkey and Egypt) and militaries. Now that Iran has the capability of producing nuclear technology and weaponry (it has long had the ability to transport biological, chemical and nuclear weaponry by way of the Shahab missile series), Iran is as powerful as the Arabs are anxious. The Iranians know that no country is prepared or powerful enough to attack them for any reason. Whatever the Iranians do from here on out, “Nothing will happen.” So then, is it really wise for the Arabs to distance their Shiite communities, particularly that of pivotal Iraq? In a word, no.

Such a sectarian mentality will only empower Iran. If the Arabs position themselves as a Sunni club, where does this leave the Shiites, who are in much demand in the region. The old school Arabs want them as a bulwark against Iran. The Americans want them for the same reason. Finally, the Iranians want them, as a means of empowering their regional role as a power broker and leader. It would behoove the Arabs to reach out to the Shiites; realpolitik demands it. As of late, the Arabs have done little to show the Shiites that they should not turn to Iran for support. Have the Arabs come out strong against Sunni terrorist attacks on their mosques and homes? No. Have the Arabs done anything to tell the Shiites that they believe in their equality as Iraqis and Arabs? No. This latest spat has not aided the Arabs one bit.

But it is the feeling, on the Arab street, that the Shiites are simply Iranian proxies today, as they were during the decline of Arab rule in the Caliphate, is it not? Do not most Sunni Arabs feel that they ought to support their Sunni coreligionists Iraq, over those shuubi Shiites, whose power is rooted in an illegitimate political process? With such a public relations conundrum it seems that, for once, the Arab leaders are being held to the will of their people. The Arabs have come to an impasse. They cannot embrace the Iraqis fully as equal partners now, for that would cause to much controversy and upheaval amongst their populations. The state has too vested an interest in the “illegitimacy” of the Iraqi state now. They cannot totally break with the Iraqis, because this would overthrow entirely the regional balance of power in Iran????????s favor, and could perhaps be viewed as a show of weakness and the forfeit of Arab power in the region to Iran.

The Iranian political leadership is smug, and rightly so. It has managed to force the Arab world in between a rock and a hard place. No matter what the Arabs do regarding Iraq now, they are fundamentally impotent. There can be no serious Arab opposition to Iranian influence in Iraq, for reasons of both economy and of public relations. They have essentially bought off the last potentially “rouge” Arab state, Syria, and are now free to do as they please in Iraq. With a savage insurgency of barbarians raging, and past dues to pay, the Iraqi leadership is in no position to levy serious objections to Iranian interests in their country. All of this regional power politicking has been free to operate with the American preoccupation in Iraq. Hezb Allah, Iran????????s representative in Lebanon, may continue to rule its ministate in South Lebanon with impunity, and has the Arabs???????? early and loud objection to the Iraq War to thank. In trying to assert their role in the Middle East, the Arabs have rendered themselves inconsequential and Iran more magnanimous than ever. As the Arabs push the Shiites farther and farther towards Iran, what will America do? Talk in American newspapers of dropping strategic nukes on Iran are most certainly ludicrous examples of yellow journalism, while the mention of large scale American military intervention anywhere outside of Iraq is just as misguided. America cannot act.

In the 1970’s, Iran was considered by all informed observers to be the Middle East????????s “regional superpower.” This anointed position was seized from Iran by a decade of domestic revolution and war with Iraq. The Iraq of Saddam Hussein emerged as the region????????s main ascetic superpower following the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, while the Arabic speaking Persian Gulf states became the regions real, behind the scenes puppet masters, with Iraq owing them billions of dollars in war debt. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the successful international effort to rebuke Saddam????????s forces from the Pearl Kingdom in 1991, the region was left under stong American influence. The expansionism of the Iraqi Baéath was contained; the Islamic Republic isolated; the Arab states, except Syria and Lebanon, were American clients; and the only perceived problem for the United States was the Palestinian issue. Following September 11, 2001, the United States moved against the Taliban government of Afghanistan, solidifying its control in the region. The invasion of Iraq undid this control. It put into play regional animosities and conflicts that had been subdued under the old order and unleashed a wildfire of change in the Middle East. Iraqis held their first free elections; a 25 year old Syrian occupation in Lebanon was ended; democratic Palestinian elections were held; Egyptians were given the choice of more than one candidate for the first time in a presidential election; women were given the right to vote in Kuwait. But along with these positive changes came negative and insidious changes in the region. Iran????????s new leadership was able to behave as if the world did not matter, because there was noone to make them behave properly; anti-Semitic wars of words were launched and the Iranian nuclear program accelerated. Arab impotency and American preoccupation resulted in the expansion of the Iranian national ego. There is nothing to stop Iran????????s expansion now, with the possible exception of Israel. Revolutions are chaotic; democracies are chaotic. What we see today is the birth of a chaotic international system in the Middle East that stems from the expansion of the liberty of one regional entity, Iran, as a result of a lack of American preparedness before unleashing the winds of change. But the Iranian ego, which has been so greatly inflated by this new system may do itself in. Careless swipes at Israel and America, or even its allies to its north and east, could result in it decapitating itself. The likelihood, however, of a Middle Eastern restoration is a unlikely as the prospect for self-induced reform in Syria; almost none.

Some may ask, why fear a Middle East in which Iran is the major power? After all, Iran had this position not two decades ago and kept its cool. The reason: because the Iran of two decades ago and the Iran of today differ greatly; two decades ago, Iran was accountable to the United States and Great Britain. Today, it is accountable to no other power, and has little to lose. It has developed a domestic arms manufacturing industry, and a home grown nuclear program. It has ended the “dialogue of civilizations” that former president Mohammed Khatami began with his Algerian counterpart in hopes of bridging the cultural and ideological divide between the Islamic world and the West. Today, Iran does not care about its image as the ancien regime of the shah did. Iran does and says what it wants, when it wants. The River Rubicon has been crossed, and there is no going back. This past week, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that his country had enriched uranium. In coming years, historians will remark that April 11, 2006 marked the beginning of the Iranian bomb.