While last week’s eulogy of President Niyazov that I posted was largely sarcastic and bordered on the maniacally gleeful, I did manage to go into some detail of what I thought would occur with regards to the transition from all Turkmenbashi, all the time to whatever form the next government takes. Mentioning the huge amount of natural gas the lies underneath those sands, there will certainly be a power struggle within the country unless its elites create some form of Politburo-style consensus powersharing.

There will certainly be no democratic transition, and this is certainly echoed by every major power that is calling for a “stable” transition. Turkmenistan is run by the big money elite who take beach trips to Europe while the vast majority remain illiterate and impoverished. To summarize, the people have no power. Turkmenistan is comparable to North Korea in this sense. It teeters between chaos or near-survival.

What I did not delve into now is what this means on the international scene, and what these influential actors will do to influence Turkmenistan’s internal politics to their benefit. From what I can tell, there will be no good outcome as the jockeying begins. The United States cannot afford to simply look on as other forces begin to move in, but again, its influence over Turkmenistan has always been weak at best so it may have no choice.

The following, therefore, are what I think the four possible outcomes are followed by a brief explanation:

1. Russia, becoming the world’s foremost gas monopoly, will exert its influence in order to get a pro-Russia leader installed. It simply cannot afford a rough transition that would lead to a decrease in gas supplies flowing from the country. This would be the least that would happen, as I don’t think any leader would be able to ignore Gazprom’s knocking. However, at the most, Russia would want to acquire all of Turkmenistan’s natural gas delivery infrastructure as it has attempted to do throughout all of the former CIS. It’s not enough to simply have a lot of gas — the key is in controlling the infrastructure. If Russia can get even more of it, combined with its attempts to do so in Belarus and even Western Europe, its dominance in the energy sector will be absolute.

2. Do to years of repression, both socio-religious and economic, traditionally secular Islamic Turkmenistan will experience an Islamic revival. If this isn’t a breeding ground for the radical form of this religion, I don’t know what is. For the United States (and even Russia), this would be a major strategic blow in the War on Terror, as a potentially radicalized population goes the way of the Chechens. Turkmenistan, with the world’s 5th largest natural gas reserves, will have a radical Islamic government with a ton of money to throw around. (Possible Iranian influence?)

3. With hundreds of thousands of security personnel, there is the potential for serious unrest in the country as rivals for power scramble in a free-for-all now that Turkmenbashi is gone. In this scenario, lots of people die, gas deliveries get cut off, and the body of the snake whithers now that the head is gone. It turns into a failed state; pure chaos.

4. The elites get together and decide by consensus who will replace Turkmenbashi so that they can all benefit. To me, this is the rational and self-interested position on their part. Due to Turkmenbashi being so paranoid, I would not be surprised if their ended up being a lot more cooperation in government now that he’s out of the way. I’m not sure as of yet if there will be a cleansing of his image, yet the propaganda has been so huge for so long they may have to keep up the myth so that the entire system doesn’t crumble. It is worth noting that since Turkmenistan is run like a business for the benefit of the elites’ personal wealth, I would not expect an expansion of political and civil liberties that would allow people to challenge this power and fortune. However, with more rational actors involved, we may see an expansion of economic freedoms.

Out of all the scenarios, number four is the one I expect the most. There has already been some shuffling in the regime, indicating that those with the most influence have neutralized any potential ambitions, and they have chosen the deputy prime minister as the favored presidential candidate. It seems to be a very stable transition, though as listed above, anything is possible. What was not listed above, however, is the possibility that Turkmenistan can have a successful transition to liberal democracy. I put it in the realm of near-impossibility. There are no structural factors conducive to it, and there are no strategic actors in the country who have the power and ability to effect it. Sad to say, but what we actually want is to hope for scenario four, because it could be the first step on a century-long journey to what could resemble democracy.