It was not more than a couple of weeks ago that I picked up a copy of Newsweek at the embassy with that same title. It detailed Moqtada al-Sadr’s rise to power; the murders of his Shia rival, the hesitance of American troops to kill or capture him, and his domination of presdent-day Iraqi politics. Overall, not much new information. However, it was the headline that said it all. Moqtada al-Sadr, given either the lack of will or the lack of ability on part of the Iraqi and American ground forces to counter him, has become the most powerful man in Iraq.

He gives the word and thousands of people riot in the street. He gives the word and any man will end up with his hands tied and his head blown to bits. He gives the word and the current government no longer has a majority in the parliament.

Now that’s power.

American ground commanders have learned a lot in the past few years from this hesitance. They’ve learned that raiding mosques for weapons wouldn’t provoke the strong public outcry that they had expected, and if it did the anger subsided rather quickly. They also learned that killing insurgent leaders mya lead to a temporary increase in attacks, but those tapered off relatively quickly. The decision to hesitate in killing Moqtada al-Sadr, then, was likely a bad one. Public disapproval likely would have been high, and unrest should certainly have been expected, but at least he would not be around today creating the havoc that he has.

Since then, and in the period since I read the Newsweek article, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has signed onto the American plan to disband all armed militias, saying that no outlaw, regardless of sectarian orientation, will be given shelter.

Sounds great if you believe him. This is coming from a man who has previously forced American forces to end blockaids aimed at the Shia militias. Judging by his record, Maliki is no different than any other sectarian politician in the country. Yet there is reason to believe.

Today, a top aide and media director named to al-Sadr named Sheik Abd al-Hadi al-Darraji was arrested, and in the past couple of weeks two others top commanders, Abu al-Sudour and Sahib al-Amiri, were killed. As the United States prepared to deploy an additional 20,000 troops to Baghdad, Sunni and Shia militias alike are fleeing the city for their more traditional tribal areas. According to this report, al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army has been ordered to basically blend into the population for now, with many commanders in hiding elsewhere in the country. If anything, the American military should be smelling fear.

The ease with which American forces are slaying al-Sadr’s top men should be an indication of growing intelligence gathering abilities. Night operations used to completely wipe out the leadership would be the best way to clear out the ranks and it appears that the U.S. military will not hesitate in pursuing this to the utmost. Daylight raids using large amounts of troops would need to be used both tactically as well as just for patrolling. In essence, in order to weed out the baseline of al-Sadr’s men, an overwhelming presence of American and Iraqi troops must be available to monitor every corner of Sadr City. This is why the troop increase is so important.

And the troop increase itself leads us to the last question, the very bottom-line reason for having faith in Maliki in the first place. Why is this happening now? As I was putting my thoughts together on this, it happens that TigerHawk got the words right out of my mouth. It’s all about personal security for Maliki and the rest of the politicians.

Having failed to bail out in time, it is very heartening that al-Maliki is now supporting a severe crackdown on the Shiite extremists. He knows that his personal risk increases with every Shiite militia commander he arrests, and eventually he will pass through a door through which he cannot return. Still, he is going after al-Sadr’s thugs. That means that al-Maliki believes, or at least hopes, that (i) the new plan has a chance for success (which suggests that he believes a sufficient number of Iraqis will join in the effort, they having put their markers down), or (ii) even if the United States does withdraw, there are enough Iraqis prepared to take on the extremists of both sects that he stands a good chance of surviving to the finish of the big fight to come.

Since he was elected prime minister, Maliki has never really been able to do his job as a unifier and builder of a nation. The fact is, the only reason he got the job was because Moqtada al-Sadr through his large political support behind him. This accounts for all of the protection he has gotten over the past year. But protecting al-Sadr and his militia means disaster for the future of the country. It would mean civil war with no uncertainty. Saudi troops move in. Iranian troops move in. An absolute bloodbath ensues.

With all of these threats around him, and even from Washington, Maliki needed a way out of this bind. A security net of 20,000 American troops is just what the doctor ordered to make sure that the country’s center of power and government work, Baghdad, is secure enough so that the politicians may actually be able to function and do what needs to be done. With Maliki protected, he can be free to pursue the Mahdi Army without the worry that al-Sadr will give the order to remove his head.

Governments are always most vulnerable at their center of power. The fact that the Mahdi Army was at Maliki’s backdoor made him incredibly vulnerable to doing the wrong thing lest he be killed. It is the reason that every major conqueror goes for the capital. It’s the reason, even, why mass protests like the Orange Revolution in Ukraine’s own capital city of Kiev were able to force the government to give into the protestors’ demands.

If American and Iraqi forces can secure Baghdad, then there is a good chance that this plan will work.