You know the story so far: Russia suddenly drops an oil price bomb on impoverished Belarus, dramatically increasing the price Belarussians are charged because the country was insufficiently slavish in its obedience of the Kremlin, and Belarus responds with a massive tax on Russia’s Belarus oil pipeline transits to Europe, whereupon Russia threatens to cut off all oil shipments to Belarus, and Belarus then bitterly backs down from its tax. Where do we go from here? What does it all mean?

Lionel Beehner, a staff member at the Council on Foreign Relations, has an article on the New Republic website (subscribers only) entitled “Minsk Meat: Why Russia’s Imperialism is Good for the West.” The article follows on the heels of an earlier NewRep piece entitled “Pipe Dream: Moscow’s Growing Resource Nationalism.”

Beehner begins by observing that the Russia’s attempt to weaponize its energy assets is nothing new, and in fact “it is becoming a winter ritual for Russia to get into the ring with one of its neighbors and provoke an energy fight. Last January, a pricing feud between Russia and Ukraine briefly disrupted gas shipments to Europe and raised fresh doubts about Russia’s reliability as a stable energy supplier. Now, one year later, Moscow has taken the gloves off again, this time against a longtime ally, Belarus.”

Beehner argues that Russia’s actions may actually be good for the West, since it presents us with the opportunity to wedge Belarus out of Russia’s sphere of influence and, simultaneously, democratize it. He writes:

Higher energy costs could help unseat Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. His Stalinist-style regime has been labeled Europe’s last “outpost of tyranny” by the U.S. State Department. Western governments have tried to undermine the mercurial ruler for years, but he has survived thanks to the economic, political, and military support of Moscow. Yet the gas crisis–which lasted for 60 hours before Lukashenko lifted the transit tax–may portend worse relations ahead. A proposed political union–a decade-old plan between Minsk and Moscow to establish open borders, a common currency, and eventual political integration–has been delayed if not permanently derailed. And, without Russian handouts, Belarus’s economy will suffer and Lukashenko’s power may unravel. Meanwhile, his domestic opposition, emboldened by a strong showing at the polls last year, will gain more strength amid such an economic slowdown. In fact, the irony of the whole situation is that Gazprom, normally the Goliath-like bogeyman in energy disputes, may in fact be doing the West a favor. By squeezing Belarus, it is unwittingly installing the conditions needed for greater political change. As The Wall Street Journal put it, “It’s a shame this Russian epiphany didn’t happen before Mr. Lukashenko rigged and bought, with Russian energy, his latest ‘reelection’ last March.”

Beehner believes that higher energy costs will “crack the veneer of stability” that Lukashenko has painted over the the country’s dire economic circumstances by means of economic subsidies from Russia to the tune of $4 billion annually. He writes:

“The so-called stability of Belarus’s economy was the stability of an addict getting cheap drugs,” Belarusian economist Leonid Zaiko told Vremya Novostei, a Russian newspaper. Belarus’s gas tab is expected to exceed $1 billion in 2007, while inflation could more than double. Without Russian support, Lukashenko cannot keep wages high or pensions paid. Faced with these added economic burdens, Belarusians will agitate for greater political change. And, in contrast with previous years, Belarus now boasts a viable opposition candidate, Alexander Milinkevich, a bushy-bearded former physics professor. In his failed bid for president last year, he called for greater openness in government, future membership in the World Trade Organization, and less integration with Russia. With Belarusians blaming Russians for their energy woes, they may be more amenable to Milinkevich’s idea of putting greater distance between Minsk and Moscow.

This reality may “significantly alter Lukashenko’s foreign policy” as Belarus is “forced to look elsewhere for cheaper energy and export markets, perhaps even westward.” He believes that “political relations between Russia and Belarus may be irreparably damaged” and points out that “some analysts say the gas-price hike signals the Kremlin’s growing distaste for Lukashenko’s antics and is aimed more at regime change in Minsk than a more equitable gas price” especially since “Putin can’t stand Lukashenko.” Even if Belarus does not move Westward, he notes, the mess may serve to put the kibosh on any thoughts of union between the two countries. Russia is working on means of circumventing Belarus as a transitway for oil shipments, and dominated by the oligarch class it may end up consuming its oil resources rather than coverting them into military assets. The oligarchs have houses in Europe, they don’t see it as an invasion threat. This means they don’t see Belarus as a crucial buffer state. Thus, Beehner prescribes:

Instead of criticizing Russia, Europe should welcome the economic pressure on Belarus. Of course, Europeans favor unimpeded flows of gas and energy prices unencumbered by Putin’s political whims, but they also would prefer a more democratic and pro-Western government to replace Lukashenko’s regime. Brussels has little leverage over Belarus. But it knows that, if Moscow were to withdraw its political, economic, and military support from Minsk, this might bring about eventual political change. Europe finds itself in the awkward position of, at least privately, condoning Gazprom’s bully-like behavior. A two-day disruption in its oil supply is a small price to pay for the eventual removal of Europe’s last remaining dictator.

Beehner has left two significant factors out of his analysis, which make his thesis all the more compelling.

First, a destabilized Belarus presents a target of opportunity not only for the West but also for Russia, and the oligarchs are not the only political force in the country. There are plenty of neo-Soviet thinkers who rue the day Belarus and Russia were separated, and who would prefer that Belarus return under conditions of subservience. Just as Soviet forces swept into Germany and seized part of it following the fall of Berlin, if the Lukashenko government topples we could easily be faced with a race situation once again for control over Belarus. Beehner’s analysis urges us to be ready to run that race.

Second, opposition to what is happening in Russia today should be a matter of bipartisan unity in the United States. The New Republic is generally thought of as a publication of the left, but you can find just the same concern about Russian energy imperialism being expressed on the right, for instance in the Weekly Standard. So we not only have the opportunity to achieve something vital, but to achieve it by working together on a common goal.

In the “Pipe Dream” piece, NewRep special correspondent Joshua Kurlantzick exposes the connection between neo-Soviet nationalism and Russia’s only viable powerbase, its energy resources. The nationalists may be interested in destabilizing and recovering their “lost asset” in Belarus (to say nothing of Ukraine and Georgia), but also in seeking to upend Eastern Europe itself. When have we ever heard them recognize that their control over the Baltics, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and so forth was wrong-headed or immoral? Viewed in this light, and given that Russia’s “president” is a proud KGB spy, European outrage over the Belarus move is entirely appropriate and understandable, even if there is something to be said for keeping it in check so as not to dissuade Russia from further nationalist missteps (on the other hand, foreign opposition might actually encourage the nationalists).

Kurlantzick writes:

In the uproar over the Litvinenko killing, which might signal a renewed foreign presence by Russia’s security forces, European nations may be missing the biggest threat from Russia. As the Putin government has consolidated state control of Russia’s mighty oil and gas sector, it has gained vast leverage over Europe. As I noted last fall, several factors have led to Moscow’s growing resource nationalism. The rising price of oil, which has more than tripled in value since 1999, fills Russia’s coffers with cash. Skyrocketing demand, partly due to the emergence of China and India, and the absence of new discoveries of oil and gas, have made Russia’s gas deposits, the largest in the world, even more valuable. President Vladimir Putin clearly views energy as a weapon Russia can use to claw its way back to global power, and Putin’s recentralization of political control in the Kremlin, which has proven popular with the Russian public, has given him the leverage to crush private oil and gas companies. He followed through, destroying private firm Yukos and tossing its head, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, into a Siberian jail, and then retaking other private companies. Still, until recently, the Russian government seemed wary of dramatically flexing its petroleum muscles outside its borders or with foreign firms. Perhaps it feared it would alienate foreign investment needed to upgrade its oil and gas infrastructure. Perhaps it did not want to ruin its chances to get into the World Trade Organization (WTO), vital to boosting Russian trade. But the Bush administration now backs Russia’s entry into the WTO, decreasing Washington’s leverage over the Kremlin, and Moscow has begun to wield its petroleum weapon more openly. “Russia since last year has been enjoying some feeling of euphoria, that feeling that we have so much money, so many resources that we can do what we want,” Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of the journal Russia in Global Affairs, told The International Herald Tribune.

As a result of this “euphoria,” Kurlantzick observes, nationalism has increased and so its economic expression, nationalizaiton. He notes: “In recent months Moscow has directly threatened foreign oil companies. It has refused to let foreigners acquire a stake in Shtokman, a large northern gas field, and it has declined to let other companies access Russian pipelines. It recently forced Royal Dutch Shell to give up its stake in an exploration project on the eastern island of Sakhalin, the largest single foreign investment in Russia. Shell sold its share to its Russian partner for a below-market price. Perhaps because the West needs Russian oil and gas, Moscow’s financial markets barely budged after this appropriation of the Sakhalin project.”

How long will it be before nationalization fuels the international expression of nationalism, imperialism? Kurlantzick warns: “Europe must pay attention. Gazprom now dominates much of the European market, a chilling realization as Russia becomes more and more authoritarian and less and less predictable. As Vladimir Milov of the Institute of Energy Policy told The Economist, Russian state control Äof gasÅ can also mean ‘irrational behavior and decisions.’ (State control hurts average Russians, too, who do not benefit from outside investment: The Energy Information Administration noted that “Russia’s natural gas sector has been stunted primarily due to aging fields, state regulation, Gazprom’s monopolistic control over the industry, and insufficient export pipelines.”) In fact, a recent analysis by the Financial Times revealed that Gazprom signed deals or entered into negotiations with more than twelve European nations in 2006 alone. By 2010, the FT predicted, Gazprom alone may control 33 percent of the European Union gas market, leaving an entire continent dependent on the Kremlin. Once that happens, the Litvinenko affair, sadly, might look like a minor problem.”

In short, Russia may try to succeed with oil and gas where the USSR failed with nukes and soldiers in consolidating an imperial grip over Eastern Europe, ultimately waging a very literal cold war with Western Europe and the United States. Belarus may be the first battlefield in that struggle, and we can choose whether to fight it there or, like Britain chose to yield ground to Hitler in the early going, wait until the oil and gas bombs start falling all around us.

Kim Zigfeld writes for the Russia affairs blog La Russophobe.