Over the past six months, and especially since Russia cut off the flow of natural gas through Belarus, tensions between the two countries’ political elites has been at a divisive high. Belarus had to give up a majority stake in its Beltranshaz pipeline system or face a huge increase in gas prices. As we described here almost a year ago, such a gas increase would affect the everyday Belarusian to such a huge degree that the impact would likely cost President Lukashenko his job.

What Russia has done now, however, is to put Lukashenko on the spot. No longer is Russia subsidizing his regime’s existence through cheap gas to be resold at higher prices for a tidy profit. Instead, Russia is seeking the complete unification of Russia and Belarus through economic coercion rather than with negotiation. Lukashenko was essentially set up to take a fall, as his government will find it hard to survive without the gas profits, and now he may have no choice but to do as the Kremlin pleases. In this regard it appears that Lukashenko’s days as a parasite are over.

That doesn’t mean he’ll go down without a fight. Russia’s moves have caused Lukashenko to reconsider Belarus’ geopolitical position (and by that, I mean his position). The previous friendship with Russia is now over, replaced by a kind of mercantile imperialism more akin to a rapist than a father-figure. Lukashenko needs friends desperately, and the only place to turn to is… Europe!

No, seriously.

To prove that I’m not just blowing steam, take a look at the latest rhetoric coming out of Lukashenko’s mouth over the past few weeks. I guarantee you’ll wonder who this guy is. It doesn’t sound like him at all; in fact, it contradicts almost everything he’s ever said in the past.

Speaking to an academic forum in Minsk, as I judge it a graduation ceremony, Lukashenko said thus, according to the Eurasia Daily Monitor:

In his speech to recipients of doctoral diplomas and professorial chairs, Lukashenka announced that Belarus ought to pursue ???????the only foreign policy course possible for our country: We are ÄsituatedÅ in the center of Europe and we must be on normal terms with the East and the West.??????? Instead of a balanced policy, ???????We have been flying on just one wing for quite some time,??????? Lukashenka disapprovingly said. He went on to propose borrowing European solutions — citing Finland, Sweden, Germany, France, and Poland as possible examples — for solving Belarus???????? economic problems (apparently selecting those four ???????old??????? EU countries for their reputed social-protection models). Neither would he ???????rush toward the United States or wherever.??????? There would be ???????no radical change,??????? he asserted, but simply a policy reflecting Belarus???????? interests and its geographic location.

The lesson from the recent and ongoing conflicts with Russia over energy supply and transit, Lukashenka said, ???????is just how much we need investors from Europe and the United States.??????? He wished aloud for ???????Western energy corporations to acquire stakes in Belarus???????? energy transit systems??????? and for the EU to respond positively to Minsk????????s initiative for an energy partnership Äan ???????energy dialogue??????? is actually on the agendaÅ. As he has throughout the energy conflict with Moscow, Lukashenka again equated the issue of energy security with that of the independence and sovereignty of Belarus. Pairing Belarus with Ukraine as the transit corridors essential to Europe????????s energy security, Lukashenka noted that the Russia-triggered supply crises recently made that fact clear to the EU as well.

In remarks implicitly addressed to the Kremlin, Lukashenka reaffirmed his recent vows to ???????never let Belarus be swallowed up by Russia,??????? not to introduce the Russian ruble in Belarus (???????an oblique way to deprive us of our independence???????), and to take reciprocal steps following ???????Russia????????s destruction of our customs union.???????

He paid the usual, hollow lip service to ???????brotherhood??????? with Russia, even as a special meeting of the Russian Duma????????s Council on the same day in Moscow blamed Minsk for thwarting the ???????union state.??????? In concluding the Council????????s meeting, Duma chairman Boris Gryzlov noted that the Belarus government????????s tactics had turned the union state into a mere ???????myth.??????? Any real work toward that goal would necessitate ???????a lengthy process of convergence, the success of which Äin turnÅ depends on the establishment of a relationship of trust,??????? he announced after the session, which included representatives of government ministries and agencies involved with Belarus. The implication seems to be that the ???????union state??????? is being frozen officially and indefinitely.

Lukashenka????????s overtures to the West sounded awkward on a number of counts. He exaggerated not the fact, but the extent of Europe????????s reliance on the Belarus energy transit corridor (???????the West will not enjoy energy security without Belarus???????). He called on the EU to open its markets for Belarus products and to allow them to compete without addressing the issue of quality, which makes such products uncompetitive on Western markets. And he described Belarus as a shield for Europe against uncontrolled migration from the East, implicitly asking for compensation in the form of EU trade preferences. The latter point in any case marks a clear change of tone from Lukashenka????????s impulsive warnings last year that he may allow migrants from the East to flock to the EU unless Belarus receives some trade or visa preferences.

Omitting any mention of economic and political reforms is the most conspicuous failing of Lukashenka????????s overtures to the West thus far. Yet, the energy dialogue with the EU may serve to open a door to economic reforms. Last week????????s visit to Minsk by Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly president Rene van der Linden (who met with senior officials but avoided a meeting with Lukashenka) might create an opening for dialogue toward political reforms.

Overall, Lukashenka????????s signals suggest that he is considering the possibility of coming in from the cold, though he is clearly unsure how to go about it.

There are some good arguments for engaging with Lukashenka now that Russia is driving him away personally. Western investment could help modernize the country, bring tons of jobs to the people who only make about $100 a month, and eventually develop such a middle class that political reform would eventually be inevitable.

Yet with very little gas to sell now, that investment would certainly extend his rule as he regains his economic legitimacy. Lukashenko also continues to make overtures to Western enemies such as Iran, in fact having sent an invitation to Ahmadinejad just days ago. Indirectly helping to prolong Lukashenko’s rule would in many ways be immoral, and the long term potential democratization of the country that comes with it is hardly assured. In that case the West would simply be allowing him to parasite off of us rather than Russia, for some a risk that might seem worth it but one that would inevitably allow for the country to continue its stagnation. His long-term rule could also be a security threat, given his fraternizing with the likes of Ahmadinejad, Chavez, and Kim Jong-Il.

What has to be realized about Lukashenko is that, in a way, he is the ultimate nationalist and realist. Rhetorically he defends the country’s sovereignty at every step, whether it be from pressure from the EU or pressure from Russia. But just like before, what this actually means is that he is defending his own sovereignty to completely control what goes on in Belarus — especially the money. If Russia absorbs Belarus then he as well as the rest of the political elite will be out on the streets with some new pro-Russian regime in place. Russia will make sure of that. Since that’s the case Lukashenko is scrambling everywhere to fill the budget gap. He sells tractors and arms to some of the most odious regimes on the planet, and now he’s looking to bring the EU into the fold.

If my senses are correct, then Lukashenko is just trying to do to the West what he’s been doing to Russia for years: play every side, get the money, and never follow through. If Europe is to go with this, it would need to make some big political demands that can be verified, and the only way that Lukashenko can credibly verify his accession to any demands is to reform the economic and political system. Fat chance! This means that the West will potentially have to decide. Will Russia be allowed to take Belarus completely? Or do we make Lukashenko our bastard instead of there’s?

The answer is if and only if the investment comes at the price of reform. Otherwise we’d be no better than Russia in this regard.