Throughout most of the Cold War, prevailing wisdom in foreign policy suggested that international relations between governments and the study of comparative politics should remain separate. The leaders of the United States spent most of their time meeting with, negotiating with, and occasionally threatening leaders from the Soviet Union. Whether or not people were being sent off to the gulag or purposely starved made no difference. Those people had no power, whereas the Politburo did.

This went on largely until the Helsinki Accords were signed in 1975, effectively tying America’s foreign policy to the Soviets’ treatment of its own citizens. Ronald Reagan turned this into one of his favorite past times. Foreign policy became a 3-D chess game, with America playing the Soviets, and the Soviets playing their people. Therefore both international relations and comparative politics were irreversibly connected — if America advanced, so did the oppressed Soviet people, and vice versa. Likewise, if the Soviet leadership advanced, it meant America had a potentially weaker influence on how they treated their own citizens.

Such philosophies come in cycles. At once the Wilsonian rhetoric of freedom and democracy will be the choice of the day, and when executed poorly, realpolitik (where the second game of chess is ignored completely) is called upon. Inevitably there will be problems with this as well, and the pendulum will swing back in democracy’s favor.

Until recently, democracy was high on the list of America’s priorities, especially for the Middle East. Advancements in women’s rights, opposition representation, and elections have made great strides in just a few years from Lebanon to Kuwait to even Saudi Arabia. Yet with a deteriorating situation in Iraq — which is the central part of the freedom agenda — the case against democracy is weighing heavy both at home and abroad. Exporting it, for now, is an idea that is doubted.

Yet just at a time when America????????s foreign policy is turning the corner toward realpolitik once again, the Shia Islamic regime in Iran is aggressively pursuing a policy of exporting its own revolution.

Iran understands the connection (and often disconnect) between internal politics and the leadership of countries. The mainly Sunni Arab regimes of the Middle East have taken it upon themselves for decades and centuries to oppress the Shia minorities in their territories. They are deprived of basic human rights ???????? even more so than others ???????? and in general are poor and prevented from making anything of themselves. They are also a sizable population, especially concentrated densely in certain areas, making them a ripe target for Iranian infiltration ???????? just as it has in Iraq and Lebanon.

The dynamics of this Shia revolution are much like those of Hugo Chavez????????s Bolivarian Revolution. It incorporates the resentment of an oppressed majority against the ruling classes. In the latter case, it is the indigenous Andean people of South America where there has been a noted trend that the greater the oppressed population, the greater chance of and mandate for this revolution. These Bolivarian leaders ???????? like Evo Morales of Bolivia, Rafael Correa of Ecuador, and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua ???????? all hail from countries with majority indigenous populations.

The Shia community, however, is a vast minority in the Islamic world, comprising only 15% of the total population. But they also comprise a majority in many densely populated areas. Over 60% of the population of Bahrain is Shia. Furthermore, Yemen, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have large minorities of Shia, concentrated heavily in the respective capitals. Even Saudi Arabia has a large Shia minority that actually makes up a majority of the population in the eastern province of Al-Hasa as well as the western provinces of Jizan, Najran, Asir, Al-Bahah, and Abha. Significantly, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman all have sizable Persian minority populations as well. They are usually used as migrant workers; afforded zero human and political rights and ripe for radicalization.

It is tempting to assume that numbers don????????t necessarily make reality, and that this is all the delusion of a single writer. Yet that is not the case. Iran????????s imperial ambitions are real and well-known even outside of Iraq. The Middle East Newsline reported on February 8, 2007, that Shia rebels in Yemen had received large sums of money and heavy weaponry, including rocket-propelled grenade launchers and anti-tank missiles, from Iran. It reported earlier on February 6 that the Bahraini authorities had to move in on Shia protestors as unrest begins to deepen in the country, leading officials to believe that a future insurgency is possible. To prove that this is not just a recent phenomenon even, the Iran Democracy Monitor reported last October that local news stations have noted increasing government monitoring of Shia groups, citing ???????non-Al Qaeda sleeping cells??????? being provided financing and indoctrination by Iran. It is also spearheading a campaign to convert Syria????????s poor to Shia Islam.

Just like the Bolivarian Revolution, the Shia Revolution led by Iran is taking charge ???????? and fast. Iran????????s coffers flush with petrodollars and bunkers full of military hardware are finding their way across the Middle East, sowing the promise confrontation.

It is perhaps ironic that just as Iran begins its own policy of ideological exportation that the United States is ending its own. While some may see this as a de-escalation of conflict between the two, in fact it is a terrible travesty. Democracy and liberal reforms may be the only way that the Arab governments can deflect mounting domestic pressure and prevent further infiltration of Iranian influence. The Shia have real grievances ???????? and the only way to redirect this anger effectively is to establish a means by which these issues can be addressed. Democracy, not radical Islam, is the answer.