It had to happen sooner or later. The high expectations and aspirations of the Lebanese people are slowly degrading into a state of national melancholy. Undoubtedly, Lebanon will never be the same after March’s Cedar Revolution, but that won’t stop the country’s professional politicians from pulling as many strings as possible to stay in power. Actually, it is no wonder that a sense of disillusionment has set in as May 29 nears. Now that Syria has pulled out, the precedent for a unified anti-Syria opposition has been removed as each party forms alliances and election lists with formerly hostile rivals. All of this is occurring within the framework of the controversial 2000 election law which, due to political squabbling, was not changed in time for this electoral season. In order to understand much of the political maneuverings leading up to Sunday, it is very important to understand the basis of this law and the electoral system.

Elections will begin on Sunday, May 29, and will continue on the next three consecutive Sundays until June 19. The 2000 electoral law which was re-adopted utilizes the mouhafaza, a big electoral district, as compared to the qaza, a smaller electoral district. Below is an electoral map of the various mouhafazas:

(Courtesy: Ya Libnan)

Given that this law was created and adopted in a heavily Syria backed parliament several years ago, it naturally favors the old political order and has been the source of great controversy since its adoption. Maronite Christian Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir has been one of the most outspoken critics of the law, saying — in the least fervish — that it sorely under represents the Christian sects of Lebanon. There are large Christian minorities in regions like South Lebanon and Beqaa, where pro-Syria parties like Hizb’allah, Baath, SSNP, and Amal are guaranteed to win. A newer electoral law, due to the smaller districts, would have given more accurate representation to such minorities. The complaint of the Patriarch is that due to the 2000 law, the seats allotted to the Christian sects will be chosen by Muslim voters instead of Christian ones.

Though he has been accused of stirring sectarianism, something which needs to hurriedly die on the vine, he does have a good point. I think Tony, from Across The Bay, does a fantastic job of describing how the supposedly sectarian system actually serves as a melting pot.

I’ve written this before, but let me say it again here. The categories of “Muslim” and “Christian” are all but meaningless politically in Lebanon. The system is not based on the representation of “Muslims” and “Christians.” This is legally wrong, and assumes that “Muslims” are a monolithic, coherent political cluster, and the same goes for Christians. In reality, each one is divided into several sects, which are in turn divided into subcategories (families, regions, political inclination, etc.). Those are the divisions that count and are reflected in parliament and in the elections. The corollary to that are the alliances in the election and in parliament, which create what’s known as “real representation.” In part, this was the complaint of some in the Christian circles, that some “Christian” candidates on certain lists were really the choice of the dominant political figure or alliance in that particular district, as opposed to being the choice of the Christian voters (or certain Christian parties). In that sense, that particular Christian candidate will for the most part be allied in parliament with the non-Christian figure/list on which he ran. Of course this fluctuates, as evident for instance with the MPs Bassem Yamout and Nasser Qandil who ran on the late Hariri’s list only to stab him in the back (and those are both “Muslim” MPs). Meanwhile, the “Christian” MPs on Hariri’s list (like the late MP Fleihan for instance) were loyal to his line, thus giving him, a Sunni Muslim, a larger “real representation” in parliament, even if they were Christians. The other corollary of course (a positive one) is that this way you get Christians voting for Muslim MPs and vice versa, thus rendering the entire notion of “sectarian bigotry” meaningless (cf. this article by Archbishop George Khodr, which touches on this issue, and this related article by Hazem Saghieh). It also makes Ciezadlo’s claim that “Muslim votes count less” even dumber than it already sounds. Is that clear? Apparently it wasn’t for Ms. Ciezadlo, and those who think like her.

The Cedar Revolution has helped melt these sects together to form a greater sense of national unity, again making these sectarian tensions increasingly irrelevant. Therefore, the problem is not necessarily the lack of representation for Christian sects, but the fact that the current law will allow many of the same players and parties to be re-elected despite the change in the national mood. Syria has left, and so the unifying issue is gone while the “subcategories” Tony speaks of remain to a large degree. This is how today’s bizarre election alliances are taking shape.

Michel Aoun’s return from exile in France and subsequent failure to conjure and alliance with Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt sparked the first real split in the opposition’s ideological direction. He is staunchly anti-Syria, however, has been relatively asinine by taking credit for Syria’s withdrawal because of his support for UNRES 1559. With regards to this, the devil is in the details. Resolution 1559 calls for the disarming of Hizb’allah, the international solution, but Jumblatt and Hariri’s parties support an “internal resolution” and insist that Syria’s pullout was based on the Taif Accord. Insofar, this is true, and it has been the foundation for the alliance between Hariri and Jumblatt with Hizb’allah and Amal. This strange alliance, as well as Hariri and Jumblatt’s willingness to participate under the old election law, are the other reasons for the split.

Up until a few days ago, Aoun was trying to negotiate between them over districts in Mt. Lebanon, as well as with supporters of Sitrada Geagea’s Lebanese Forces, but failed to do so. All that was left was to negotiate with pro-Syria Talal Arslan and Dory Chamoun for coordination on electoral lists. The latter fell through. He will put up a fight, but without ever being tested at the polls, and firing off at people all around, Aoun is in a bad position. He is most likely to run in Jbeil-Kesrwan, a mostly Christian district, where he will have better chances. Mt. Lebanon and the North are looking to be the most contested and interesting electoral battles to watch.

The alliance between Saad Hariri and Hizb’allah’s Nasrallah was born out of a supposed deal struck between Nasrallah and the late Rafik Hariri just a week before his death. This deal was based on the notion that Hariri would not call on Hizb’allah to disarm personally, and Saad has affirmed this. Walid Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party is also part of this alliance, and Nasrallah has urged his mainly Shiite followers to vote for Hariri’s lists in Beirut and Jumblatt’s lists in Aley-Baabda. In fact, many of the seats have gone uncontested and the opposition is likely to sweep them all. But Hizb’allah has also struck a sweet deal with another Shiite bloc, Amal, in order to retain total dominance of the South and likely Beqaa. The Lebanon Daily Star has much more on the nitty gritty of the electoral battle coming up.

As you can see, it is no wonder that people are becoming disillusioned after the Cedar Revolution; not about its ideals but about the politicians that supposedly represent them. The same people that were hosting counter-demonstrations against one another on the streets of Beirut are now joining hands in order to ensure their political toes aren’t stepped on. They still want Syria out, they still want to form a national consensus of unity, and they still want Syria-backed President Lahoud ousted, but they want it all to happen without the political shift that acknowledges the shift of the national mindset. Because of this, it seems like Hizb’allah may be in a stronger political position than before March.

In the very least, there is at least one thing to remember which should evoke hope in this process. After this election, there will undoubtedly be a new election law. And most importantly, the Lebanese elections will be free of Syrian influence. This means that the politicians who will be running the country will no longer have to pander to the Syrian regime, but instead to the people of Lebanon. Because of this, I believe that despite the current disillusionment with the various parties and Hizb’allah’s arms problem, Lebanon has already well begun its trek toward a healthy political environment. To quote Mustapha from The Beirut Spring:

This is why it is no surprise that the leaders and the outside powers are proving responsible: Signs are everywhere: Jumblat has left an empty druze seat on his list so that he doesn????????t humiliate Talal Arslan. Ghattas Khoury sacrificed a guaranteed seat on the Hariri list for the ???????greater good???????. The Americans, French and Jumblat rushed to allay the patriarch????????s concerns by stressing his very important role. Jumblat, Hariri and Quornet Shahwan are making nothing but conciliatory noises in face of Aoun????????s aggressivness. Even Hezbollah is doing some soul searching and are removing from their lists people that are considered provocative. I also expect that the opposition might (just might) leave an empty maronite seat for Franjiyeh in the North.

Thomas Friedman said it best once:
In a Democracy, every day feels like a mess, but after a year, you’ll feel that a lot of progress has been made.

Like I said, I think the Lebanese are getting the right idea.

UPDATE: The first round of Lebanon’s election have started in Beirut.