There’s an article by Carnegie senior associate Amr Hamzawy that I think you all will find very interesting. It contends that the slow opening of political systems in the Middle East is allowing for progressively better representation of what the population actually wants, which is why Islamists are beginning to take seats. Since the majority of people in Middle Eastern countries are actually quite conservative, these forces need to be engaged appropriately so that they will learn how to govern pragmatically and provide a valuable democratic alternative to the current secular authoritarian regimes. Here are his main conclusions:

The electoral success of Islamists can impact positively on Arab politics at various levels. First of all, it puts an end to the dangerous illusion that political openings in the region will ultimately replace authoritarian regimes with secular forces committed to the ideals of liberal democracy as practised in the West. Realities on the ground speak a different, compelling language that necessitates a better understanding of where Islamist forces stand and what their priorities are. To go on investing hopes in seculars, even when their existence is more imaginary than real, becomes partially pathological in the current situation. Arab seculars remain incapable of reaching out to considerable constituencies in their societies, or of substantially influencing political developments.

More important, however, are the consequences of greater inclusion in politics on Islamists themselves. Participation in governments or forming significant opposition blocs in elected bodies gives rise to a whole set of new challenges. Recent Islamist platforms, although in general endorse pluralism and moderation, remain based on ideological sloganeering and moral claims. Whereas both components are strategically beneficial for actors operating at the fringes of the political sphere, sustaining them while acting from within greatly diminishes the ability to deliver. Comparative experiences outside the Arab world suggest that the pressure to move beyond ideology and to develop pragmatic policy preferences generates considerable tensions in religious movements, which in the long run result in more this-worldly orientations. There is no reason to believe that Islamist forces in the Arab world will not follow suit.

Yet, any effort to deal objectively with Islamists cannot avoid highlighting the gray zones in their positions and practices. With regards to gender equality, civil and political rights of non-Muslim population groups and religious freedom, Islamists continue to be trapped in discriminatory illiberal stances on vital social and cultural issues. These attitudes should not be ignored, nor should the absence of perfection be the enemy of the good. Moderation and pragmatism within the Islamist spectrum will be a long and uneven process. A key step in this process is Islamists’ inclusion in the political sphere in a way that confronts them with the real challenges of managing contemporary societies, and gives them space to experiment in public with different moderate views. Here lies the democratic potential of the Arab elections in 2005. Political spheres that reflect social realities and accommodate increasingly pragmatic Islamists are by far more conducive to democratic openings than the continuation of the authoritarian sustained grand illusion of religion-free politics.

This has been one of the most historic years in terms of holding elections, from Egypt to Palestine to Lebanon to Iraq. Yet in every single case, we have seen religious political groups take some form of power, whether it is as the ruler, as part of a coalition, or as opposition. Meanwhile, liberal forces have floundered miserably. The first question foreign policy makers have to ask is: Why is that?

For the past several decades, secular authoritarian regimes have repressed civil society and economic development, leading to backward discontentment with what people see as illegitimate regimes. However, the one place that cannot be touched is the mosque. It is a powerful institution, and in the face of such repression elsewhere, it becomes an outlet for dissent, making it into a political institution. It engages and influences communities wide and large. Groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are able to take this a step further, organizing large grassroots networks to mobilize supporters. They exist as the only alternative to the regime, and so people voice their dissent through Islamist organizations.

Meanwhile, liberal forces are having a hard time organizing. Not only are the societies generally conservative, but more importantly, they are constantly crushed by the governments. They don’t even get a chance. This has caused a huge gap in the grassroots organizational capabilities of liberal parties and their Islamist counterparts. The end result is something like a pendelum; it will swing from the one extreme of secular authoritarianism to the other extreme of religious something. Whatever that something is depends on how these groups rule when they come to power once the political system is open enough. Would a group like the Muslim Brotherhood, which declares that its moderate, actually be moderate when it gains control? This is at the center of Hamzawy’s argument. If we elections to be held across the Middle East, we must be prepared for Islamists to come to power, and we must be ready to engage them in a way that promotes pragmatic and moderate over ideological governance.

We have seen what happens when political systems are open too early, however. When glasnost was undertaken in the 1980s in the Soviet Union, it caused great social upheavel within a system that was ultimately unreformable and the Soviet Union fell. Representative elections were held. The political system was largely open. It was at that point that drastic economic reforms were undertaken, but it resulted in a crooked capitalism in which a few people were able to rise to the top at the expense of everyone else because property and legal rights hadn’t been properly secured yet. Due to the devastating effects, Russia is experiencing a political backlash against democracy and free markets. Similar results have been experienced in other countries that embarked on a similar path.

It is therefore reasonable to expect that, if representative elections are held in the Middle East, that the new regimes they produce will not be liberal. So I would like to take Hamzawy’s argument one step further. The question foreign policy makers must now ask themselves is: How do we help create societies in this region that are liberal so that, if elections are held, they produce genuinely liberal governments? Pushing for democracy in the Middle East doesn’t just mean elections. There’s much more. Hitler was able to come to power through elections, after all.

What needs to come before political reform above all else is economic and legal reform. Property rights, small business, free trade, fair courts, and uncorrupt police forces all have a role to play in creating the basis by which political openness can occur. This basis is economic development. The more money people have, the more of a stake they have in forcing pragmatic governance, and in order for that to happen, it requires them to develop civil society. Opportunity itself is the precursor to liberalism. Political openness will follow naturally, because society will take up that issue itself internally without the need for outside influence.

So what must happen is we must pressure authoritarian regimes to reform their economies and legal rights past the point of no return. Otherwise, dictators like Hosni Mubarak will simply allow elections, and when the Muslim Brotherhood wins, he can just say, “Told you so.” We must circumvent this ploy, though every situation is different. The West is likely to better be able to pressure a regime in Latin America or Eastern Europe than it would be a country like Uzbekistan, where Russia and China have much more influence. But if our influence is used correctly where it can be, it should lead to a smooth transition to liberal democracy over this generation.