My post yesterday questioning whether opening elections to the Muslim Brotherhood might bring about disaster got more responses than any other post I have done on Publius Pundit. I felt that some of the issues raised by the comments had sufficient significance for democratic development theory to justify a full post response. (To read my initial post and the comments, see Egypt: Democracy Enthusiasts’ Toughest Test?)

There were some responses with which I agree or at least find reasonable:
(1) It is almost certainly true that were the Muslim Brotherhood to come to power in Egypt, this would lead to widespread disenchantment and a reaction against them. This has happened already in Iran. While support for Iran’s Islamist regime was never overwhelming, some who originally supported it have turned against it.

(2) I agree that the MB would probably moderate its aims somewhat if it came to power.

(3) Regarding the argument that supporting dictators out of fear of the alternative is foolish: I would say that we can back off support for Egypt’s current government without pressuring Egypt to allow the MB to compete openly. The $2 billion subsidy the U.S. pays to Egypt was in exchange for peace with Israel, but that is in Egypt’s interest anyway, and it is certainly correct to point out that funding autocrats like Hosni Mubarak is backfiring. The U.S. gets nothing for that aid and a lot of problems from it.

One option would be for the Egyptian government to allow an open election for the non-Islamist parties, but not for the MB, at least for a few years. Given the MB’s huge organizational advantage, this would allow the pro-democracy reformers some time to build up the strength to compete. I don’t see any reason that it is necessary to go all the way one way or the other immediately.

Ultimately it is their decision, not ours, so my point is more about fostering proper expectations than arguing for a specific course of action.

I also disagree, or would at least question, some of the other responses to my post:
(a) Point (1) above does not necessarily solve the problem, and probably won’t. Iran’s theocracy has been unpopular for a long time, yet it has funded Hizbullah and Palestinian terrorists since the 1980s, has provided at least some assistance to Al-Qaeda, has provided weapons and logistical assistance to the jihadists fighting us in Iraq, and is likely within a year or two of having nuclear weapons. The fact that the MB could not win a second open election does not reassure me. I don’t think there would be one.

Likewise, regarding point (2) above, being in power would likely temper the MB, but this might mean that rather than launch an invasion of Israel, Egypt would begin covertly funding and harboring terrorists. Support for Hamas is so strong in Egypt that I find it inconceivable that they would not. And they would likely support Al-Qaeda.

(b) The argument that repression breeds radicalism is a common one, made by scholars as well as generalists, but with this I disagree because looking across a broad range of countries I don’t see the empirical relationship.

In the case of the MB itself, it did radicalize relatively following Nasser’s repression during the 1950s, but they were jihadist to begin with, and their moderation in recent years is directly related to the severe repression they suffered during the 1990s. Repression did bring radicalization in Algeria, but it brought moderation in both Morocco and Tunisia. Repression in Syria and Iraq caused Islamists (who survived the massacres) to just get out of the game; the most radical went abroad, and the rest just stopped resisting. In Saudi Arabia Islamists (the Wahhabis) were terroristic to begin with, were given a share of power, and stayed terroristic over time. In the other Persian Gulf countries, governments mainly tried to co-opt Islamists by having Islamic trappings but essentially repressed Islamists themselves, and none have faced the kind of radicalism Egypt has. I just don’t see a relationshp.

Outside the Middle East, there is also no clear repression=radicalization relationship. Jihadists are thriving in Europe, where many of their members have the right to vote, and a number of democratic countries have had very resilant terrorist movements – Britain, Spain, Italy, India and Japan being prime examples.

In short, although the “repression=radicalization” theory may seem logical, and it is surely always true of some individuals, it seems that the key is the nature of the original movement. If a movement begins with violent tendencies, it will go violent whenever it can’t get its way democratically – this is why democracies have terrorists. Those that begin peaceful by and large stay that way.

(c) And yes, it would be good to empower Egyptian reformists, as one reader wrote, but be careful about this. Back in 2002, Bush cut Egypt’s aid for arresting a pro-democracy reformer, I think it was Saad Ibrihim (mentioned in the comments), and this united Egypt’s factions around the government, and against the U.S.

Reformers like Ayman Nour really are our best hope, but it must be remembered that American support can backfire because anti-Americanism is so strong there. Don’t be fooled by the relatively strong pro-American sentiment found now in Iraq; while most Iraqis are very happy that the U.S. invaded their country, the invasion is still vehemetly opposed by majorities across the Arab world as an attack on Islam.

Contributed by Kirk H. Sowell of Window on the Arab World, and More!